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I. INTRODUCTION
Those of us concerned about the ready availability of experts will-
ing to testify to incorrect opinions1 greeted the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 with much
1. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence,
26 JURIMETRICS J. 245, 246-47 (1986); M. Neil Brown et al., The Perspectival Na-
ture of Expert Testimony in the United States, England, Korea, and France, 18
CONN. J. INT'L L. 55, 68-69 (2002) (citing commentators who have expressed con-
cern about expert testimony); Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony,
20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 482 (1986).
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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fanfare. Finally, it seemed, there would be an end to the easy access
to the witness stand enjoyed by those claiming to be experts. After all,
in no uncertain terms the Supreme Court told federal trial judges
(and, by extension, state trial judges) that they had a "gatekeeping
role"3 that required them to exclude proffered expert testimony when
it was not "scientifically valid."4
In the decade since Daubert, the decision and its progeny 5 have
been analyzed, applauded, and criticized6 at great length.7 Both crit-
ics and supporters have reported, argued, or assumed that Daubert
would substantially reduce the opportunity for experts to testify in
civil trials. Implicitly or explicitly, Daubert has been seen as a solu-
tion to the problem of faulty expert testimony because it provides an
opportunity for parties opposing such testimony to argue for its
exclusion.
As is so often the case in the law and in life, as Daubert has aged, it
seems that it is not quite the cure-all solution that we initially envi-
3. Id. at 597.
4. Id. at 592-93. Six years after Daubert, the Supreme Court held that "Daubert's
general holding-setting forth the trial judge's general 'gatekeeping' obligation-
applies not only to testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, but also to testi-
mony based on 'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge." Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
5. Like any other important decision from the United States Supreme Court,
Daubert has been cited and applied in numerous lower court decisions. In addi-
tion, it spawned two important decisions by the Supreme Court itself. The other
two cases in what is sometimes referred to as the Daubert trilogy are Kumho Tire
and General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). See Catherine E. Brixen
& Christine M. Meis, Codifying the "Daubert Trilogy". The Amendment to Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 527 (2000).
The Joiner decision established abuse of discretion as the appropriate stan-
dard for appellate review of a federal district court's decision to exclude expert
testimony under Daubert. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 138-39. Applying this standard, it
held that the district court's exclusion of expert testimony due to the insufficiency
of the studies relied upon by the experts did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 146-47.
In Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court clarified that the Daubert gatekeeping re-
quirement applied not just to scientists but to all other experts, who by the provi-
sions of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence testify "based on 'technical' and
'other specialized' knowledge." Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141. It also reiterated
that a court deciding whether to admit or reject an expert's testimony could con-
sider the factors listed in Daubert, but it was not required to do so because the
Daubert "test of reliability is 'flexible,' and Daubert's list of specific factors neither
necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case." Id.
6. Commentators are not the only people interested in Daubert. Its primary holding
has been codified into the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 now allows the
admission of an expert's testimony only "if (1) the testimony is based upon suffi-
cient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case." FED. R. EVID. 702.
7. A recent check of the "Journals and Law Reviews" database on Westlaw indicates
that "Daubert" appears in the title of almost 500 articles.
[Vol. 84:675
ENHANCING DAUBERT EXCLUSION
sioned. With the benefit of more than a decade of experience in a post-
Daubert world, judges, trial lawyers, and evidence scholars can see
that Daubert gatekeeping, while helpful in excluding some faulty ex-
pert testimony, has not eliminated all such testimony from civil tri-
als.8 Exclusion of expert testimony remains a drastic and somewhat
unusual judicial response. 9 As one trial attorney noted, "Daubert
changed things, all right. Before Daubert, when I filed a motion to
keep a rotten expert off the stand, the judge rejected it out of hand,
saying the problems that I had pointed out went to weight, not to ad-
missibility. When I file the same motion now, the judge considers it
very carefully, perhaps even holding a hearing on the motion and tak-
ing it under advisement so that she can weigh each party's arguments.
Then, after careful consideration of my motion, the judge lets the ex-
pert testify."o
Exclusion of expert testimony, even when no less an authority than
the United States Supreme Court has required judges to carefully con-
sider it, can never be more than a partial solution to the problem of
faulty expert testimony. In some portion, quite possibly the majority,
of the cases where parties offer faulty expert testimony, the judge will
be unwilling to tell an expert that her testimony is so flawed that it
does not merit admission into evidence."
Therefore, despite the significance and the fanfare associated with
Daubert and the possibility of exclusion of expert testimony, the land-
scape of expert-dominated civil trials has, in some ways, not changed
all that much. In many cases, the jurors are still asked to determine
which of two impressively qualified experts, who have testified to dia-
metrically opposite opinions, is wrong.12 Whenever there has been a
rejected Daubert motion to exclude expert testimony, the jurors face
this task because the judge has not been able to determine which of
the experts is so obviously wrong that her testimony should be ex-
8. See David W. Peterson & John M. Conley, Of Cherries, Fudge, and Onions: Sci-
ence and Its Courtroom Perversion, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2001, at
215 (noting that an expert may be able to avoid exclusion of her testimony if she
is able to make her testimony "look[ I more scientific," even if it is not actually
scientific).
9. Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evi-
dence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 251, 255 (2002).
10. The trial attorney was one who attended a continuing legal education seminar
taught by the Author, who has long since forgotten the name of the attorney and
even the location of the seminar, but who remembers the basic thoughts ex-
pressed. The quote in the text, though, is almost certainly not a precisely correct
one. Rather, it is the Author's best recollection of this trial attorney's summary of
how Daubert affected expert admissibility issues in civil cases.
11. See infra section II.A.
12. See infra subsection II.A.2.
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cluded.13 In other words, in most of the tough cases, it will be the
jurors' job, not the judge's, to determine which expert is wrong.
In a system that is concerned enough about faulty expert testi-
mony to adopt a procedure that attempts to weed it out, at least in
some cases, jurors should be equipped with information that can help
them make this difficult decision about which expert is wrong. Thus,
it is time to turn some of our attention away from the rather atypical
cases of exclusion of faulty expert testimony to the more typical cases
of admission of that testimony.
This Article attempts to do just that. In Part II, it describes the
context in which experts and non-experts testify (or, in cases where
courts exclude proferred expert testimony, do not testify) in civil
cases. 14 Part III reviews the information provided to jurors who must
decide which of two or more conflicting fact witnesses is wrong. Part
IV compares fact witnesses to experts and argues that jurors should
receive at least as much information about experts as they do about
fact witnesses, due to the substantial influence some attorneys exer-
cise over the formation of expert testimony. Part V notes the ways in
which courts have, incorrectly, provided jurors with less information
about experts and outlines the proper application of ordinary witness
rules to expert witnesses. Part VI discusses the advantages of apply-
ing ordinary witness law to experts.
II. EXPERT TESTIMONY IN CONTEXT
To understand the dynamics of expert testimony, one must first
understand the types of issues that experts address in civil litigation.
As most law students and lawyers come to realize, there are three (or
perhaps only two) basic types of issues that opposing parties dispute
in litigation: issues of law (perhaps); 15 issues of fact; and mixed issues
13. See infra subsection II.A.2.c.
14. This Article focuses on retained expert witnesses in civil trials. For discussions of
expert witnesses in criminal trials, see, for example, Edward J. Imwinkelried,
The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-Testifying Experts: Rees-
tablishing the Boundaries Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work
Product Protection, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 19 (1990); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Case Against Evidentiary Admissibility Standards That Attempt to "Freeze" the
State of a Scientific Technique, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 887 (1996); Allison Morse,
Social Science in the Courtroom: Expert Testimony and Battered Women, 21 HAM-
LINE L. REV. 287 (1998); William C. Thompson, DNA Evidence in the O.J. Simp-
son Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 827 (1996).
15. Arguably there is no such thing as a pure issue of law in a given case because the
facts determine what law is applicable. To take an extreme example, the law
applicable to a product liability suit may be in a state of flux in a given jurisdic-
tion, so that the parties could conceivably dispute the legal issue of whether neg-
ligence or strict liability applied in that jurisdiction. See infra notes 18, 21.
However, that dispute would arise only if there was a product liability claim at
issue in the litigation. If the litigation was, for example, a contested divorce and
[Vol. 84:675
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of law and fact. To the extent that there are disputes that could be
classified as pure issues of law, however, judges are responsible for
determining the applicable law with the help of attorneys, so courts
generally do not allow expert testimony about the law alone.16
A. Types of Disputes Between Experts
Therefore, experts testify about either mixed issues of law and fact
or about pure factual issues. For purposes of analyzing these issues, it
is helpful to think of a simple two-party case with the rather typical
scenario where an expert for the plaintiff testifies to an opinion that is
directly contradictory to the opinion testified to by an expert for the
defendant. 17
1. Mixed Issues of Law and Fact
In a mixed issue of law and fact, the plaintiffs and defendant's ex-
perts may disagree about either the underlying facts, the application
of the law to those facts, or both. All of these disagreements can be
classified as mixed issues of law and fact.
neither the wife nor the husband had any pending or resolved product liability
claims against any party, there would be no legal issue in the case about the
proper product liability law. In this sense, every issue of law is at least partially
an issue of fact because the facts, disputed or not, determine which legal issues
are in play.
16. See, e.g., Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F.3d 1308, 1328 (10th Cir. 1998)
("Generally, an expert may not state his or her opinion as to legal standards
...."); Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, 475 (8th Cir. 1995) (excluding
expert testimony that "was not a fact-based opinion, but a statement of legal con-
clusion"); Shahid v. City of Detroit, 889 F.2d 1543, 1547 (6th Cir. 1989) (excluding
expert testimony because it "amount[ed] to a 'legal conclusion'"); Mathews v.
Farmers Ins. Co., No. Civ. 04-6117-AA, 2005 WL 1565261, at *9 (D. Or. June 27,
2005) (discounting expert testimony about legal conclusions); United Phosphorus,
Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 675, 688 (D. Kan. 1997) ("To the ex-
tent Harrison is purporting to give legal conclusions and opinions, such testimony
is inadmissible."); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Reinsurance Co., 796 F. Supp.
275, 281 (S.D. Ohio 1991) ("[E]xpert testimony on matters of law is generally not
admissible . . . ."), affd, 961 F.2d 1578 (6th Cir. 1992).
17. Often, of course, there are more than two parties to a particular case. In some
multi-party cases, several parties settle prior to trial, so only one plaintiff and
one defendant remain in the case when it is tried. However, there are other cases
where there are more than two parties, even at trial. Sometimes each of the mul-
tiple parties retains an expert to testify about a disputed issue.
To make things easier for both Author and reader, however, this Article will
assume a lawsuit and a trial with one plaintiff and one defendant. For the most
part, it will also assume that the plaintiff has retained an expert witness who will
testify in a manner that is largely inconsistent with the testimony of the defen-
dant's retained expert witness. When there are more parties and more experts,
things get a bit more complicated, to be sure, but the issues discussed in this
Article remain largely the same.
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Product liability suits present a fairly typical example. Under the
widely followed section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
"One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the consumer or to his property is subject to liability ...."18
Assume that the plaintiffs expert testifies that a widget's design has
caused five deaths to users of the widgets and that, in the expert's
opinion, that rate of death from the use of one million widgets renders
the widget's design defective and unreasonably dangerous.
The defendant's expert might dispute that the widget's design
caused five deaths. If so, the two experts would be disputing an issue
of fact.1 9 However, the factual dispute regarding the number of
deaths caused by the product's design is a secondary issue that will
guide the jury in its resolution of the primary issue of whether the
product is unreasonably dangerous, which is a mixed issue of law and
fact.20
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Of course, the American Law
Institute ("ALI") has superseded this Restatement with a more recent version.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1997). However, the
example in the text remains relevant, because section 402A has been written into
product liability jury instructions in many jurisdictions. See Clinton H. Scott,
Note, Defective Condition or Unreasonably Dangerous Under the Tennessee Prod-
ucts Liability Act: Just What Does It Mean?, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 945, 950 (2003)
("Since the inception of Section 402A, the strict liability doctrine has been
adopted and used in varying forms throughout the country."); cf. Andrew A. Ben-
nington, Statutory Stalemate: Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negli-
gence in South Carolina, 56 S.C. L. REV. 815, 818-21 (2005) (noting the influence
of section 402A strict products liability and the ALI's refinement of the standard
in the Restatement (Third)). For a review of states that have adopted or rejected
the newer standard, see Cami Perkins, The Increasing Acceptance of the Restate-
ment (Third) Risk Utility Analysis in Design Defect Cases, 4 NEV. L.J. 609,
616-25 (2004).
19. Although the number of deaths caused by the widget's design is an issue of fact,
the jury's verdict will not turn solely on its resolution of the dispute regarding
how many persons were killed by the widget's design. Instead, the jury will be
instructed that its verdict will depend upon whether it believes that the widget's
design made the product "defective" because it was "unreasonably dangerous."
Therefore, the experts' dispute about the number of deaths caused by widgets is
an issue of fact that affects an issue of law, rather than an issue of fact upon
which the jury's verdict may turn without reference to the law, see infra note 23
and accompanying text.
20. A dispute between experts about the death rate attributable to a product's de-
sign, like other factual disputes, might be characterized as a purely factual dis-
pute if the experts agreed about all other matters. In other words, if both the
plaintiffs expert and the defendant's expert agreed that five deaths per million
widgets would render the product unreasonably dangerous and therefore defec-
tive, but disagreed about whether five deaths could be attributed to the product's
design, some might characterize this as a purely factual dispute. However, in
such a case, the two experts would presumably reach different conclusions about
the product's level of dangerousness and, therefore, alleged defectiveness, so it is
also appropriate to characterize such a dispute as a mixed question of law and
fact. In actual trials, however, it is probably more common for two experts who
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It is also possible that the plaintiffs and the defendant's experts
would agree that the widget's design caused five deaths, but disagree
about whether this rendered the widget "unreasonably dangerous"
and, therefore, "defective." The plaintiffs expert would testify that
five deaths per million is excessive, while the defense expert might
testify that five deaths per million is an acceptable and reasonable
death rate, because the product realistically cannot be designed to
cause fewer deaths. Such a dispute would almost certainly focus, at
least to some extent, on the level of danger to be expected from the
type of product at issue. For example, if a million yo-yos produced five
deaths, the yo-yo's design might be unreasonably dangerous in the
view of an expert, even if the same or another expert would conclude
that an automobile seat belt system that failed to prevent five deaths
per million cars was not defective.
Of course, it is also possible, and perhaps common, for experts to
disagree about both underlying facts and the legal conclusions to be
drawn from these facts. In other words, the experts might disagree
both about how many deaths are attributable to widgets and about
whether the death rate rendered the product unreasonably dangerous.
Those of us who teach law and produce most of the scholarship
about law (i.e., law professors), naturally tend to focus upon disputes
that have at least some legal component. In our scholarship, we de-
bate what the law should be.21 To the extent that we consider the
role of experts in these scholarly disputes, we tend to think of mixed
issues of fact and law. When we teach, we again tend to focus upon
debates about the law. The reported appellate court decision that is
the key component of most torts (and other law school) classes facili-
disagreed about a product's rate of injury to also disagree about other related
matters, such as the reasonableness of the product's design.
21. For example, for many years torts scholars debated in print about whether strict
liability should replace negligence in product liability cases. See, e.g., Benning-
ton, supra note 18, at 816-21 (outlining the history of the negligence versus strict
liability debate); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Harry Kalven, Jr., Torts: The Quest
for Appropriate Standards, 53 CAL. L. REV. 189 (1965); Dustin R. Marlowe, A
Dose of Reality for Section 6(C) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Lia-
bility, 39 GA. L. REV. 1445, 1450-51 (2005) (reviewing the history of this debate in
a section entitled "Products Liability as an Evolving, Often Confused, Doctrine");
Marcus L. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects
in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957); William L. Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791
(1966); Jacqueline S. Bollas, Note, Use of the Comparative Negligence Doctrine in
Warranty Actions, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 763 (1984); John L. Diamond, Note, Eliminat-
ing the "Defect" in Design Strict Products Liability Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529
(1983). Though strict liability has now largely replaced negligence in product lia-
bility cases, we continue to dispute the nuances of the law of strict liability. See,
e.g., Bennington, supra note 18; Marlowe, supra; Perkins, supra note 18, at 625;
Scott, supra note 18.
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tates and reinforces this focus on the law. Law students are trained to
quickly identify "the facts of the case" when they brief and discuss
these appellate opinions, so they can concentrate on the legal issues in
dispute. Professors and students in law school classes tend to implic-
itly2 2 assume that these facts are largely undisputed.
2. Disputes About Historical Fact
Trial attorneys, trial court judges, and jurors have a different out-
look. For those who function in trials and in the litigation process
leading up to trials, disputes about facts are often paramount.
a. Recognizing Pure Disputes of Historical Fact
A purely factual dispute is a disagreement between the parties
and, in the context of this Article, between their experts, about what
happened on a particular occasion. It is a "pure" dispute of fact if it
can be framed in terms of an inquiry into what happened on a particu-
22. Given the predominance of the appellate court opinion in torts and other law
school classes, this is an understandable view. In appeals following trials, factual
disputes have usually already been resolved at the trial court level. Though it is
possible for an attorney to appeal a factual finding by the jury at trial, the defer-
ential standard of review for factual issues makes them an unattractive basis for
appeal. If the appeal comes before a trial is held, it will often be based upon the
trial judge's granting of a summary judgment of dismissal. Under the law of
summary judgment, the appellate court will be required to resolve all material
factual disputes in favor of the party against whom summary judgment was
granted-usually the plaintiff. Therefore, in such cases, there is no significant
dispute about the facts in the appellate court, but there is a significant issue
about the law applicable to those facts. Thus, in most of the appellate court cases
used in law school pedagogy, there is no active dispute about the facts.
Professor Irving Younger, whose teachings about trial advocacy still influence
many litigators, noted the gulf between the law school and the courtroom view of
"facts":
The facts, we tend to think at the beginning [of law school], are like
acorns on an oak tree. When they are ripe, they drop to the ground. If
you want some, just bend down and pick them up. Observe how they are
arranged. Should they fall into the pattern we designate "negligence,"
Brown wins his suit against Kendall. If the pattern is that of one of the
bundle of rights we call "property," Armory prevails over Delamirie.
Why, there's nothing to it but learning the patterns. That, I repeat, is
what we tend to think at the beginning. It is what teachers of the law
seem to have thought for a very long time.
With experience and reflection comes a deeper comprehension. Facts
do not grow on trees, we learn. They must be investigated and proved.
Cases are more often won before a jury than in the appellate court-
room .... The facts, in short, are just as obscure as the law, just as
malleable, just as controversial, and in determining the outcome of a
lawsuit or the elaboration of a rule, more important than paltry logic.
Irving Younger, The Facts of a Case, 3 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 345, 346-47
(1980), quoted in SANFORD H. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 13 (7th ed. 2001).
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lar occasion, without any reference to the law.2 3 The resolution of
that factual dispute by the jurors often has tremendous legal conse-
quences, because the jury's verdict might turn on that resolution, but
the issue itself is one of historical fact, not law.
For example, assume that the parties in a product liability case
dispute the historical issue of whether the plaintiff was using the de-
fendant's widget when she was hurt. To take a not uncommon and
already referenced example, assume that the plaintiff claims that the
seat belt system on her car was defectively designed and that these
design defects caused her injuries. Assume further that the defen-
dant, which manufactured the plaintiffs car and its seat belt system,
asserts that the plaintiff was not using her seat belt at the time of the
accident, so the seat belt system could not have contributed to her in-
juries. In such a case, the plaintiffs attorney would presumably pre-
sent the testimony of an expert (presumably a mechanical engineer)
who inspected the seat belt system after the accident for evidence of
seat belt use, examined other available physical evidence, reviewed
other available data, and concluded that the seat belt was used in the
accident. The defendant would presumably call its own expert who
reviewed the same information and concluded that the seat belt was
not used.2 4 The critical dispute in such a case can be framed in a sim-
ple question of historical fact, without reference to the law of products
liabilty, i.e., "Was the plaintiff wearing the seat belt at the time of the
accident?" A special verdict form could address this question to the
jury.25 The jury's resolution of this dispute will have tremendous le-
gal consequences, because the plaintiffs suit will presumably be dis-
missed if the jury determines that she was not wearing her seat belt,
but the issue itself is one of historical fact.
23. One judge's list of examples of disputes about historical facts that jurors are
asked to resolve included "'whether the light was red or green, whether the car
was on the wrong side of the road, [and] how fast it was going."' In re Application
of the Comm. for the Pres. of the Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury, 151
N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1008 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (quoting Justice Peck's radio address on
station WMCA).
24. Engineers who attempt to determine whether a seat belt was used in an accident
examine the belt webbing and hardware for signs that the belt was loaded during
an accident. See CHARLES A. MOFFATr ET AL., DIAGNOSIS OF SEAT BELT USAGE IN
ACCIDENTS 255, 257-58 (Soc'y of Auto. Eng'rs, Tech. Paper No. 840396, 1984).
For a more detailed discussion of a dispute between experts regarding
whether a plaintiff used a seat belt, see Stephen D. Easton, Ammunition for the
Shoot-Out with the Hired Gun's Hired Gun: A Proposal for Full Expert Witness
Disclosure, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 465, 510-13 (2000).
25. A question in the special verdict form would presumably incorporate the burden
of proof, so it would look something like: "Did the plaintiff prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that she was wearing the seat belt at the time of the
accident?"
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b. Presence of Pure Disputes of Historical Fact in Trials
The oft-stated,26 but now sometimes disputed,27 proposition that a
trial is a search for the truth is based upon the presence of at least
some28 factual disputes between the parties. In jury trials, we ask the
jury to resolve these factual disputes.29 The importance of factual dis-
putes in jury trials is underscored by the commonplace standard jury
instruction advising the jury that the jury, not the judge, is the deter-
miner of facts and that the jury's primary job is to determine the
facts. 30
c. Incorrect Expert Testimony on Pure Historical Fact Issues
Scholars sometimes ignore or, at least, underappreciate an impor-
tant aspect of disputes between experts about historical facts. Despite
our tendency to believe and proclaim to our students that "there are
two sides to every story" that are entitled to roughly equal respect, a
pure issue of historical fact can only have one correct answer.3 1 Ei-
26. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980), quoted in James v.
Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311 (1990) ("There is no gainsaying that arriving at the
truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system."); Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Alle-
gheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); House v. Combined Ins.
Co. of Am., 168 F.R.D. 236, 246 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Felder v. Wyman, 139 F.R.D.
85, 90 (D.S.C. 1991); Reilley v. Keswani, 350 A.2d 74, 75 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1975); Lee Mickus, Discovery of Work Product Disclosed to a Testifying Ex-
pert Under the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 773, 780 (1994); see also FED. R. EVID. 102 (stating that the
Federal Rules of Evidence should be interpreted "to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined").
27. See John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEx. L. REV. 277, 324-26 (1989);
W. William Hodes, The Professional Duty to Horseshed Witnesses-Zealously,
Within the Bounds of the Law, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1343, 1360 (1999) (contend-
ing that "'courtroom truth' need not match every chapter and every verse of objec-
tive truth").
28. In the absence of any factual disputes (i.e., if the parties stipulated to the facts),
there would be no need for a jury, because the judge could resolve the disputed
legal issues between the parties.
29. In re Application of the Comm. for the Pres. of the Constitutional Right to Trial
by Jury, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1008 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956).
30. See, e.g., Mo. SuP. CT. COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MISSOURI APPROVED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.02 (6th ed. 2002). Of course, some of the factual disputes
that a jury must resolve would arise as portions of mixed issues of law and fact,
but others would be pure issues of historical fact upon which the outcome of the
trial would depend.
31. To be somewhat more precise, when two experts testify to opposing opinions
about an issue of historical fact, at least one of them must be wrong, even though
it is possible in some cases for neither of them to be correct. For example, assume
that the issue of historical fact about which the experts present differing opinions
is the origin and cause of a fire, in a suit by a homeowner against her insurer for
its failure to pay for the homeowner's losses in a fire. If the home-
owner-plaintiffs expert testifies that faulty wiring in a living room lamp started
the fire and the insurer-defendant's expert testifies that the homeowner burned
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ther the plaintiff was wearing the seat belt during the accident or she
was not. It is not possible for the plaintiff, at the same critical mo-
ment, to be both wearing the seat belt and not wearing it.
Nonetheless, in every trial where the resolution of an issue of his-
torical fact turns upon the jury's resolution of a dispute between ex-
perts, there will be at least two experts who testify to opposing
opinions about an issue that can have only one correct answer. If the
plaintiffs expert testifies that the plaintiff was wearing the seat belt
and the defendant's expert testifies that she was not wearing it, one of
them is simply wrong.3 2
i. Varying Difficulty of Identifying Incorrect Expert
Testimony
Although it is sometimes relatively easy for the jury to determine
which expert is wrong, often it is very difficult. Any given dispute be-
tween experts with opposing views on an issue of historical fact will be
somewhere on the following spectrum:
One One
Clear Unclear
Answer Answer
Question Question
I I
To define terms, it is helpful to think of a scenario that would presum-
ably never happen in an actual case. Assume that a panel of one hun-
dred qualified, knowledgeable, and unbiased experts was assigned the
task of determining the correct answer to the question of historical
fact at issue in a particular case. Further assume that none of the
experts was paid or otherwise influenced or even contacted by any of
the parties, but each reviewed the available evidence. A "one clear
answer" factual question is one where all one hundred experts would
agree upon the same, presumably correct, answer. At the other end of
the spectrum, a "one unclear answer" question is one where, though
there is only one correct answer, fifty of the assembled experts would
her house down by dousing rags in gasoline and igniting them in the garage, it is
possible that both of them are wrong (if, for instance, the fire actually started in
the kitchen). In most instances of disputes between experts about a historical
fact, though, one of the experts will be correct, and the other will be wrong.
32. In such a trial, the testimony of one of the experts is just as incorrect as the
testimony of the expert whose opinion was excluded by a gatekeeping judge who
correctly determined pursuant to Daubert that expert testimony was inadmissi-
ble. In a case where the jury hears the testimony of both the incorrect expert and
the correct expert, however, it falls upon the jury, not the judge, to determine
which of the experts is wrong.
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reach the correct conclusion, but the other fifty would reach the incor-
rect conclusion.
For example, assume that the plaintiff was indeed wearing the
seat belt at the time of the accident. In a "one clear answer" case, all
one hundred experts who reviewed the available evidence would con-
clude that the plaintiff was wearing the seat belt.33 In a "one unclear
answer" case, fifty experts would conclude (correctly) that the plaintiff
was wearing her seat belt, but the other fifty experts would conclude
(incorrectly) that she was not.3 4
33. As those experienced in dealing with retained and often well-paid experts can
attest, the fact that all one hundred qualified experts would reach the same con-
clusion in the absence of litigation or other bias does not mean that a party
presenting the opposite view in litigation could not hire an expert to testify in
support of that view. As an astute judicial observer of expert witnesses said a
century ago, "There is hardly anything, not palpably absurd on its face, that can-
not now be proved by some so-called 'experts.'" Keegan v. Minneapolis & St.
Louis R.R. Co., 78 N.W. 965, 966 (Minn. 1899), quoted in Chaulk by Murphy v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing); see also Berger, supra note 1, at 91 ("[E]xperts are readily available to pre-
sent essentially frivolous theories. ... ); Mickus, supra note 26, at 792 n.87
("Certain experts are willing to advocate, in court, scientific conclusions that fly
in the face of an entire body of scientific literature."); Weinstein, supra note 1, at
482 ("An expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory,
no matter how frivolous.").
34. There are various reasons why a particular question would stump half of the
qualified, unbiased experts into giving an incorrect answer, but two of them are
probably the most prominent.
First, perhaps the scientists have not yet reached a consensus about how to
analyze available evidence. For example, half of the experts might believe that a
particular type of indentation in the seat belt webbing indicates that the belt was
used and, in the vernacular of such experts, "loaded" during an accident. The
other half of the experts might believe that the same indentation indicates a past
pattern of seat belt use, but does not indicate that the belt was loaded in the
accident. In such an instance, the level of scientific knowledge and experimenta-
tion would presumably not have evolved to the point where either theory was
eliminated or, in the case of a fifty-fifty split, even subordinated to the other
theory. If this was the state of scientific knowledge at a particular time about
the particular type of indentation on the seat belt webbing and if the seat belt
webbing contained this type of indentation after the accident, half of the availa-
ble, unbiased experts would conclude that the belt had been used in the accident
and the other half would (or, at least, might) conclude that it was not.
The other primary reason for a dispute among the unbiased experts relates to
the state of the evidence. To illustrate, let's change the state of the science. As-
sume that all unbiased experts would agree that an "XYZ indentation" on the
seat belt webbing would document that the belt was worn and loaded during the
accident. Assume further, however, that it is not clear whether the belt con-
tained an XYZ indentation after the accident. Perhaps the belt is no longer avail-
able, because it was not preserved after the accident and witnesses disagree
about the belt's post-accident (pre-destruction) condition. Perhaps it is available,
but it is not entirely clear whether it contains an XYZ indentation, because it was
exposed to the elements while the car sat in a junk yard for six months before the
plaintiff retained an attorney to represent her. In such circumstances, experts
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A given dispute between expert witnesses about an issue of histori-
cal fact is somewhere on the spectrum between a "one clear answer"
question and "one unclear answer" question. Regardless of where the
dispute lies on this spectrum, however, the jurors3 5 will be forced to
decide which of the experts is wrong, even though both of them will
presumably point to their credentials and their review of the available
evidence in the case to try to convince the jurors that they are right. If
the key question is one of historical fact and the two experts disagree
about this historical fact, by definition, one of them must be wrong,
regardless of where the issue lies along the spectrum from "one clear
answer" cases to "one unclear answer" cases.
ii. Jurors' Need for Information About the Crafting of
Expert Testimony
Once one understands that a particular dispute between experts
about an issue of historical fact 3 6 lies somewhere on the spectrum
from "one clear answer" to "one unclear answer" questions, the limited
reach of Daubert exclusion becomes rather apparent. Daubert exclu-
sion ordinarily should occur only in cases at or near the "one clear
answer" end of the spectrum. 3 7 The further a particular dispute is
who agree about the significance of an XYZ indentation might still reach opposite
conclusions about whether the plaintiff was wearing the belt.
Often, of course, there is disagreement between opposing experts about both
the state of the science and the state of the evidence. Again, however, it is impor-
tant to remember that, if the question about which the experts disagree is one of
historical fact, precisely framed, one of the experts must be wrong. This is just as
true in a "one unclear answer" case as it is in a "one clear answer" case. By
definition, it is easier to determine which expert is wrong in a "one clear answer"
case, but this does not change the fact that one of the experts is wrong in the "one
unclear answer" case also.
35. Of course, the jurors would not face this decision if the judge decided that one of
the expert's opinions was so scientifically invalid that it must be excluded. See
infra subsection II.A.2.c.ii.
36. Although this subsection focuses on pure disputes of historical fact that can have
only one correct answer, see supra note 33 and accompanying text, its analysis
applies to disputes between experts about the factual portions of mixed issues of
fact and law. A mixed issue of fact and law, such as whether a product is unrea-
sonably dangerous and therefore defective, might have more than one correct an-
swer. For example, as noted previously, a plaintiffs expert might legitimately
believe that a certain rate of death from a product renders that product unreason-
ably dangerous while a defense expert might legitimately believe that the same
product is not dangerous. See supra subsection II.A.1. However, if there is an
underlying factual dispute contained within the mixed issue of fact and law and
that factual issue is defined in precise enough terms, there can be only one cor-
rect answer. To return to the previous example, if there is a dispute about
whether a product's design caused five or less than five deaths, there can be only
one correct answer.
37. Of course, this is a bit of an oversimplification, because it suggests that general
acceptance is the only determiner of the validity of expert testimony. While this
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from this end of the spectrum, the less likely that the opponent of the
proffered incorrect testimony will be successful in convincing the court
to exclude the expert testimony.
Nonetheless, in a one answer case anywhere along the spectrum,
one of the experts is wrong. If the system is supposed to facilitate a
search for the truth, i.e., an attempt to correctly determine matters of
historical fact, this is troublesome. If the jury mistakenly decides that
the incorrect expert is correct on a case-determinative issue of histori-
cal fact, it will return an incorrect verdict.
In addition, consider the more limited role of science (or other spe-
cialized knowledge) in helping the jurors identify the expert who is
testifying incorrectly when the case is at or near the "one unclear an-
swer" end of the spectrum. In a "one clear answer" case, the attorney
who cross-examines the expert who has reached the incorrect conclu-
sion will often be able to highlight the scientific flaws in that expert's
analysis, so that the jury will understand those mistakes. As one
moves toward the "one unclear answer" end of the spectrum, 38 a sci-
ence-based cross will do less to identify flaws in the incorrect expert's
work.3 9
Of course, when one reaches the "one unclear answer" end of the
spectrum, there can be no absolute assurance that the jury will reach
the correct decision, regardless of how much scientific and other infor-
mation it receives. Nonetheless, a system that uses the jury to deter-
mine historical facts should provide the jurors with all reasonably
available information about the expert's testimony, not just scientific
information,4O to increase the likelihood that the jury will reach the
was the case under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Ct. App. 1923), under
Daubert, general acceptance is only one possible factor for the court to consider,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
38. The case may be near the unclear end of the spectrum due to the indefinite state
of scientific knowledge about the disputed issue or due to limited physical and
other evidence about the disputed occurrence. See supra note 34.
39. See Applegate, supra note 27, at 349 ("The more we accept the idea that scientific
conclusions are not inevitable, the more important it is to know precisely how
experts reach their conclusions .. . ."); cf Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ICT
Group, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 110, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Mickus, supra note 26,
at 793 n.89, regarding the importance of using cross-examination to "show[ ] that
counsel manipulated the expert's analysis and ultimate findings" in order to
"push[] the expert's testimony" to the realm of "biased science"); TV-3, Inc. v.
Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 194 F.R.D. 585, 588 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (similar); Duke T.
Oishi, Note, A Piece of Mind for Peace of Mind: Federal Discoverability of Opinion
Work Product Provided to Expert Witnesses and Its Implications in Hawaii, 24 U.
HAw. L. REV. 859, 879 (2002) (referencing Mickus's discussion of the "crucial im-
portance of discovery of expert-attorney information in allowing the jury to come
to a fair conclusion" about the attorney's influence on the expert).
40. Cf Hyongsoon Kim, Adversarialism Defended: Daubert and the Judge's Role in
Evaluating Expert Evidence, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBs. 223, 247 (2001) (not-
ing that jurors "must use their own backgrounds and experiences" in evaluating
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correct result. In such cases, in particular, the jury can use informa-
tion about an attorney's influence on the expert to help to identify in-
correct expert testimony.41
B. Similar Disputes Between Fact Witnesses
Disputes between experts testifying to directly opposing opinions
are not the only issues of historical fact jurors are asked to decide in
our civil justice system. Very similar issues are presented when two
or more fact witnesses testify to directly opposite observations. 4 2
To illustrate, it is entirely possible for the jury to be presented with
directly conflicting fact witness testimony about whether our hypo-
thetical plaintiff was wearing her seat belt. The plaintiff might pre-
sent the testimony of witnesses who saw her fasten her seat belt
before she drove away from her last pre-accident stop or from passen-
gers in the car who heard the seat belt buckle click into place. 4 3 The
defendant might present testimony from others who saw the plaintiff
drive away without buckling up, from passengers who noticed that she
was unbelted, or from ambulance attendants who removed an unbuck-
led and unconscious plaintiff from the car after the accident.44
Fact witness disputes force jurors to decide which fact witnesses
are wrong, just as expert disputes force jurors to decided which ex-
perts are wrong. In either type of dispute over an issue of historical
fact, there can be only one correct answer, so some witnesses are
wrong.
III. ORDINARY RULES APPLICABLE TO DISPUTES
BETWEEN WITNESSES
Given the similarities in jurors' resolution of factual issues dis-
puted by fact witnesses and experts, it is instructive to review the po-
tentially extensive information provided to jurors about fact
witnesses.
expert testimony, even when these backgrounds are short on technical knowledge
or experience).
41. See Stephen D. Easton, "Red Rover, Red Rover, Send That Expert Right Over":
Clearing the Way for Parties to Introduce the Testimony of Their Opponents' Ex-
pert Witnesses, 55 SMU L. REV. 1427, 1482-85, 1490-92 (2002).
42. See Kim, supra note 40, at 247-48 (noting the similarities between jury evalua-
tion of expert and eyewitness testimony).
43. If the plaintiff is alleging that a defect in the seat belt system caused her injuries,
a fact witness's testimony about her observations indicating that the plaintiff was
using the seat belt would be relevant under Rule 401 and, therefore, admissible
under Rule 402. FED. R. EVID. 401, 402.
44. Fact witness testimony indicating that the plaintiff was not wearing her seat belt
would also be relevant and admissible. See id.
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A. Information Provided to Jurors About Fact Witnesses
Under Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, all relevant evi-
dence is admissible, absent some specific provision of law rendering
the evidence inadmissible. 45 Rule 401 defines "relevant evidence" as
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of an action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."46 Under these
permissive rules, jurors may receive substantial and varied informa-
tion about fact witnesses that can help them identify which of them
are wrong.
1. Information About Problems with a Fact Witness's
Observations
First, because a fact witness can testify only about matters she ob-
served, jurors will receive information about problems with a fact wit-
ness's observations and recollections. 4 7 For example, evidence might
establish visual obstructions or substantial distance between the wit-
ness and the matters being observed;48 vision, hearing, or memory dif-
ficulties;49 or the time gap between the witness's observation and
testimony. 50 This data is the rough equivalent of information about
problems with an expert's application of science or other specialized
knowledge. For both the fact witness and the expert, there is little or
no controversy about the relevance of this core data indicating possi-
ble problems with the witness's testimony. For both types of wit-
nesses, we expect jurors to evaluate a witness's testimony in light of
these problems, which are generally established during cross-
examination. 5 1
45. FED. R. EVID. 402.
46. FED. R. EVID. 401.
47. 1 McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 10, 45 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter 1 MCCORMIcK].
48. THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIALS: STRATEGY, SKILL, AND THE NEW POWERS OF PERSUA-
SION § 6.6(5) (2005); J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS
AND ETHICS 300 (2d ed. 1993).
49. MAUET, supra note 48, § 6.6(5)-(6); ROGER C. PARK, TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK
§ 7:20 (2d ed. 2002); TANFORD, supra note 48, at 300; Edward J. Imwinkelried,
Trial Judges-Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial Judge Critically Assess
the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury's Province to
Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 14-15
(2000).
50. THoMAs A. MAUET & WARREN D. WOLFSON, TRIAL EVIDENCE § 12.3(1) (1997).
51. D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Exper-
tise fbr the Post-Kumho World, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 508, 510-11 (2000).
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2. Information About a Fact Witness's Relationships
Jurors also receive information that does not directly suggest ob-
servation or memory problems. Much of this data relates to relation-
ships between the witness and one of the parties or attorneys. 5 2
Evidence scholars, judges, and trial attorneys refer to this information
as "bias" evidence.53
a. Relationships Between a Fact Witness and a Party
If the witness has a significant relationship with one of the parties,
evidence of that relationship is virtually certain to be introduced.54
Often the relationship between the witness is a positive one, such as
brother-sister, employer-employee, or friend-friend.55 When this is
the case, the cross-examining attorney usually56 will introduce evi-
dence of that relationship. 57 If the relationship is negative, i.e., if the
witness is an enemy of a party, that party will introduce this
evidence.58
For example, assume that a fact witness who testifies about her
observation of the plaintiff wearing, or not wearing, her seat belt is
the brother of the plaintiff. Regardless of which party puts the
brother on the stand, the defendant will almost certainly introduce
evidence of this relationship. If the plaintiff calls her brother to the
stand to testify that he saw her put on her seat belt, the defendant will
introduce evidence of the brother-sister relationship in cross-exami-
52. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 47, § 39.
53. Miller ex rel. Monticello Banking Co. v. Marymount Med. Ctr., 125 S.W.3d 274,
281-82 (Ky. 2004); MAUET & WOLFSON, supra note 50, §12.3(1)(b); 1 MCCORMICK,
supra note 47, § 39.
54. Pfaelzer v. Kostner, 231 N.E.2d 668 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967); MAUET & WOLFSON,
supra note 50, §12.3(b) ("There is no express rule on bias, interest, and motive,
but its use is well established by case law."); 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 47, § 39;
JAMEs W. McELHANEY, MCELHANEY'S LITIGATION 144-45 (1995).
The law allowing the introduction of a relationship between a witness and a
party has been established for decades, if not centuries. See, e.g., Corgan v. Frew,
39 Ill. 31, 1865 WL 2954, at *4 (Nov. Term 1865); Carr v. Moore, 41 N.H. 131,
1860 WL 3267, at *3 (June Term 1860); MAUET, supra note 48, § 6.2(2)(b).
55. See, e.g., Thornton v. Vonallmon, 456 S.W.2d 795, 798-99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970);
MAUET & WOLFSON, supra note 50, §12.4(1); 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 47, § 39.
56. Of course, the attorney offering the testimony of a fact witness who has a rela-
tionship with that party may recognize the near certainty that the opposing party
will introduce testimony of that relationship during cross and decide to "front"
this information during direct. See infra note 67.
57. See, e.g., Thornton, 456 S.W.2d 795; NationsBank of Tex., N.A. v. Akin, Gump,
Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 979 S.W.2d 385, 399-400 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998); MAUET,
supra note 48, § 6.7(1).
58. See MAUET & WOLFSON, supra note 50, §12.4(1); 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 47,
§ 39.
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nation. 59 If the defendant calls the brother to the stand to testify that
the plaintiff was not wearing her seat belt, the defendant will intro-
duce evidence of the brother-sister relationship during direct
examination.
Why do we provide jurors with data about the relationship between
a witness and a party? Because we believe that jurors, using their
common sense, will tend to view testimony that favors the party with
whom the witness has a positive relationship with some skepticism
and will tend to give additional weight to testimony that hurts the
party with whom the witness has a positive relationship. 60
That is all that the jurors can possibly do with the testimony about
a relationship between a witness and a party. Evidence of a relation-
ship does not and cannot conclusively establish that the witness is
right or wrong. After all, despite the fact that the witness is the plain-
tiffs brother, it may indeed be the case that he did in fact observe her
wearing the seat belt. Therefore, in any particular case, evidence of
the relationship between the witness and the party could possibly lead
to an incorrect verdict, because it might cause the jurors to improperly
discredit the correct testimony of the plaintiffs brother. Nonetheless,
we believe the jurors who are faced with the rather difficult task of
deciding whether to believe a witness deserve to know that the wit-
ness is the plaintiffs brother, because we believe that information will
help the jurors evaluate the brother's testimony.
b. Relationships Between a Fact Witness and an Attorney
The system has the same belief in the value of evidence of a rela-
tionship between a fact witness and one of the attorneys representing
the parties.6 1 To the extent that an attorney has spent considerable
time contacting and, perhaps, trying to shape a fact witness's testi-
mony, she can expect the jurors to learn about those efforts. In such
circumstances, it will be in the opposing counsel's interest to suggest
59. Of course, the plaintiffs attorney would realize that the defense attorney will
make this point. As a result, she might try to take some of the punch out of the
anticipated cross-examination point by covering it during direct examination.
See infra note 67.
60. See Christie v. Eager, 26 A.2d 352, 353 (Conn. 1942); see also, e.g., Lawrence v.
State, 464 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Ind. 1984) ("It is essential to a trial of issues of fact
that the trier of fact determine which witnesses are worthy of belief and which
are not, and what testimony is the more reasonable and probable; that is, it must
determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence."); In re
Application of the Comm. for the Pres. of the Constitutional Right to Trial by
Jury, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1008 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (observing that one of the
principal functions of the jury "is to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses who
testify before it").
61. See Christie, 26 A.2d at 353 (detailing a party witness's cooperative approach to
counsel and stating that the "conduct of the parties ... was in no sense 'extrane-
ous' but clearly of very material significance upon the issue of credibility").
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that the attorney has had too much influence on the witness and that
the jurors should therefore discount the witness's testimony, or ignore
it entirely. Evidence about an attorney's interaction with a witness is
relevant even when those efforts do not involve any violation of the
rules of professional conduct or other law.
c. Bribes or Other Favors Bestowed Upon a Fact Witness
Of course, when a law or rule has been violated, evidence of that
violation is also relevant. A party can introduce evidence that the op-
posing party or her attorney paid a fact witness or provided other fa-
vors for her 6 2 because we expect jurors to consider discrediting the
testimony of a witness who received financial or other benefits.
3. Changes in a Fact Witness's Statements
When a fact witness testifies in a manner inconsistent with a
statement made by that witness on a previous occasion, the cross-ex-
amining attorney will make jurors aware of the previous statement. 6 3
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, such a statement is not admitted
as proof that the previous statement was correct, except when it was
made under oath.64 Instead, unsworn statements are introduced
under the rubric of impeachment. As with bias evidence, we expect
jurors to at least consider giving less credit to the witness's current
testimony when it is inconsistent with a prior statement by that
witness. 6 5
4. Testimony From (Almost) All Fact Witnesses, Regardless of
Loyalty
Finally and perhaps obviously, jurors who face the task of deter-
mining which fact witnesses are wrong are entitled to hear from al-
most 66 all available fact witnesses who observed the events in dispute.
If the jurors are forced to decide between the testimony of witness A,
who testifies that she saw the plaintiff put on her seat belt, and wit-
62. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 47, § 39.
63. See MAUET, supra note 48, § 6.7(2).
64. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a testifying witness's prior inconsistent
statement made under oath "at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a depo-
sition" is not hearsay and, therefore, is admissible as proof of the matters as-
serted in the prior statement. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). Therefore, under the
Federal Rules, prior inconsistent statements not made under oath are not admit-
ted as proof of the matters asserted in the prior statements, but only as impeach-
ment of the current testimony. In several states, prior inconsistent statements
are admitted as proof of the matters asserted in the prior statements, regardless
of whether the prior statements were made under oath.
65. See STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIMAL ADVOCACY 41 (2000).
66. When a privilege applies, a witness may be prevented from testifying or allowed
to abstain from testifying. See 1 McCoRMICK, supra note 47, § 72.
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ness B, who says she noticed that she was not belted, the plaintiff will
also put on the testimony of witness C, who heard the belt click into
place.
B. The Mechanism for Providing Damaging Fact Witness
Information to Jurors
The jurors receive information suggesting that a fact witness
might be wrong through the efforts of the attorney who hopes to con-
vince the jurors that the fact witness is indeed wrong. The key tools
that help the opposing attorney forward this information to the jury
are cross-examination and pretrial disclosure, discovery, and other in-
formation gathering.
1. Cross-Examination
Cross-examination is the primary6 7 mechanism through which ju-
rors receive information suggesting that a fact witness may be
wrong.6 S As many have noted, our system relies upon cross-examina-
tion to reveal potential problems with a witness's testimony. Indeed,
because cross is designed to bring out information damaging to the
witness when that information is available, cross is designed to be a
key part of our justice system's search for the truth.6 9
67. Sometimes, cross-examination serves a somewhat more indirect role. If the attor-
ney conducting the direct examination of a witness knows that her opponent will
bring forth harmful information in cross, she may choose to "front" this harmful
information by covering it in her direct examination. Some trial attorneys believe
that this approach removes some of the harmful information's sting and adds to
their credibility. See STEPHEN D. EASTON, How TO WIN JURY TRIALS: BUILDING
CREDIBILITY WITH JUDGES AND JURORS § 1.04 (1998); THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL
TECHNIQUES 23-24 (5th ed. 2000); McELHANEY, supra note 54, at 12; TANFORD,
supra note 48, at 257-58. Other trial attorneys dispute the wisdom of this tactic.
See Michael H. Leonard, Book Review, FED. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 54 (review-
ing EASTON, supra). Even when this strategy is followed, however, cross-exami-
nation plays a critical role, because it is the threat of cross-examination that
leads to the decision to cover the material in direct examination. Also, even when
the direct examiner "fronts" the harmful information, the cross-examiner may
attempt to re-emphasize it by covering it in cross.
In addition, there are occasions when impeaching information is presented
not in that witness's cross, but in the direct examination of another witness or the
offering of an exhibit. Sometimes such proof comes after a witness fails to admit
the harmful information during her cross-examination. See MAUET, supra note
48, § 6.12.
68. See, e.g., LUBET, supra note 65, at 90; L. TIMOTHY PERRIN ET AL., THE ART AND
SCIENCE OF TRLL ADvOCACY 294-96 (2003); Pamela B. Stuart, The Basics of Di-
rect and Cross-Examination of a Fact Witness, TRIAL, Jan. 1999, at 74, 76-77.
69. A recent case, though admittedly in the criminal justice context, added to the
long litany of voices extolling the key role of cross-examination in the search for
truth. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 45-51 (2004). In several previ-
ous cases, United States Supreme Court Justices, like many other judges, have
quoted and referenced Wigmore's famous declaration that cross-examination is
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ENHANCING DAUBERT EXCLUSION
Because cross-examination is crucial to juror access to damaging
fact witness information, it is important to understand its limitations.
These limitations stem primarily from a "commandment" regarding
cross-examination that is well-known among trial attorneys: do not
ask a question on cross-examination unless you know the answer to
that question.70
Because most skilled and experienced trial attorneys usually will
not ask a cross-examination question unless they know the answer,7 1
jurors will receive damaging fact witness information only if the cross-
examiner becomes aware of that information before trial.72
2. Pre-Trial Information Gathering Is the Key to Effective Cross-
Examination
Therefore, another key to juror receipt of damaging fact witness
information is pretrial attorney acquisition of this information. Trial
attorneys receive this information in several ways.
a. Disclosure
Since the advent of the automatic disclosure provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in 1993 and the adoption of similar dis-
closure provisions in some states, 73 attorneys automatically receive
"beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth." 5 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (1974); see, e.g., Lilly v. Vir-
ginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999); United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 328
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (asserting that, even if one disagrees with Wig-
more's dramatic declaration, "one must admit that in the Anglo-American legal
system cross-examination is the principal means of undermining the credibility of
a witness whose testimony is false or inaccurate"); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
356 (1992); see also Applegate, supra note 27, at 349 ("Whatever its faults, cross-
examination is the main tool for achieving the accuracy goals of the advocacy
system.").
70. In the late Professor Irving Younger's well-known Ten Commandments of Cross-
Examination, the fourth commandment is "Ask Only Questions to Which You
Already Know the Answer." Stephen D. Easton, Irving Younger's Ten Command-
ments of Cross-Examination: A Refresher Course, with Additional Suggestions, 26
Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 277, 297 (2002); see also DAVID M. MALONE & PETER T. HOFF-
MAN, THE EFFECTIVE DEPOSITION: TECHNIQUES AND STRATEGIEs THAT WORK
§ 2.1.4 (2001); TANFORD, supra note 48, at 303.
71. Also, to the extent that information hurting a witness's credibility is sometimes
fronted during the direct examination, see supra note 67, wise direct examiners
will adopt this tactic only when they know, or at least fear, that their opponents
are aware of this information and, therefore, might bring it out during cross. See
MAUET, supra note 67, at 23-24.
72. Cf In re McCrae, 295 B.R. 676, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2003) (noting that disclo-
sure of communications between the retaining attorney and the expert "enables
the opposing party to test the expert's opinion through more effective cross-
examination").
73. See, e.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1); UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1); W. VA. R. Civ. P.
26(a); cf ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26.1(a)(3) (requiring disclosure of the "names, addresses,
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some data that can help them locate damaging fact witness informa-
tion. Under Rule 26(a)(1)(A), each party must disclose "the name and,
if known, the address and telephone number" of potential witnesses
"that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses." 74
An attorney who receives this identifying information about a witness
who might be called by the opposing party can use it to inform her
discovery and other information-gathering efforts.
b. Discovery
Discovery is another method of acquiring potentially damaging fact
witness information. Deposition questions directed to fact witnesses
can result in the acquisition of information that might convince jurors
that the witness's testimony should be discounted or disbelieved. 7 5
Attorneys also use other discovery devices, including interrogatories 7 6
or requests for production of documents 7 7 directed to opposing parties,
to acquire such information.
In using deposition questions and other discovery devices, attor-
neys have wide latitude in their efforts to acquire potentially damag-
ing fact witness information. Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, "[plarties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party."7s
c. Self-Help Information Gathering
Some trial attorneys believe that the information that they acquire
through their own efforts, as opposed to the information that they re-
ceive from their opponents, is potentially the most valuable. When an
attorney acquires information about a witness through her own ef-
forts, there is a possibility that her opponent is unaware of this infor-
mation or of her acquisition of it.
Self-help gathering of information about potential witnesses takes
many forms. 79 An attorney may hire a private investigator to locate
and telephone numbers of any witnesses whom the disclosing party expects to
call at trial with a fair description of the substance of each witness' expected
testimony").
74. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 30-32 (outlining deposition procedures); see MALONE & HOFFMAN,
supra note 70, § 2.1.1.
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
77. FED. R. Crv. P. 34.
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Just in case the portion of the scope of discovery rule
quoted in the text was not explicit enough to make it clear, the rule also explicitly
states that parties may discover "the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of any discoverable matter." Id. Therefore, a party can use interroga-
tories, deposition questions, or other discovery devices to force the opposing party
to identify potential witnesses.
79. TANFORD, supra note 48, at 48-49.
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information about the witness.8 0 She may conduct research about her
in electronic or other databases. She may even contact her directly to
interview her.
The disclosure rules suggest that direct attorney contact with op-
posing witnesses is a treasured way for attorneys and, therefore, ju-
rors to acquire potentially damaging information about witnesses,
because they provide the attorney with the potential witness's address
and telephone number.81 An attorney can use that phone number to
contact the witness or to acquire information about her. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine another significant use of the potential witness's
telephone number.
The professional responsibility rules further document the civil
justice system's respect for the tradition of direct attorney contact
with opposing witnesses. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct al-
low such contact, without notice to the opposition, except when the
witness is the opposing party or someone else who is represented by
counsel. 82 In addition, the Model Rules prohibit an attorney who ex-
pects to call a witness from even asking that witness to avoid commu-
nicating with opposing counsel, except for parties and their relatives,
employees, and other agents.8 3 These rules reflect a policy that gener-
ally favors attorney contact with witnesses as a means to aid the
search for the truth.
IV. COMPARING FACT WITNESSES TO EXPERTS
Courts and other authorities have not always let attorneys use all
of these mechanisms to gather information about expert witnesses.
Because this difference in treatment appears to stem from differences
between expert and fact witnesses, these differences deserve examina-
tion. After scrutiny of the differences in the development of expert
and fact witness testimony, one should, I believe, conclude that courts
and others should allow at least as much, if not more, information
gathering for experts as they do for fact witnesses.
A. Differences in How Fact and Expert Witness Testimony
Is Developed
Without a doubt, fact witness testimony ordinarily is developed in
a somewhat different manner than expert witness testimony. Also,
the law of evidence bestows certain benefits upon experts that are not
80. See Lee Stapleton Milford, From Streets to Suites: Private Investigators in Civil
Cases, LITIG., Spring 2004, at 18.
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
82. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2004).
83. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2004); see infra subsection IV.B.2.
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given to those referred to as "fact," "lay," or "ordinary"8 4 witnesses.8 5
Due to both the more problematic manner in which attorneys influ-
ence the development of expert testimony and the special benefits be-
stowed upon experts, courts applying the law of procedure and
professional responsibility arguably should let opposing attorneys ac-
quire even more information about experts than fact witnesses, and
certainly should not restrict them to acquiring less information.
1. Development of Fact Witness Testimony
As compared to expert testimony, fact witness testimony often is
developed with relatively minimal involvement by attorneys. How-
ever, attorneys sometimes have a role in the development of fact wit-
ness testimony.
a. Direct Observation
A fact witness acquires her information by personally observing
critical events. As a general rule, she is not allowed to testify about
matters that she did not directly observe.8 6
Despite a relatively common misunderstanding, fact witnesses are
not always prohibited from expressing opinions. However, a non-ex-
pert's opinions must be based on her own perceptions, not upon infor-
mation provided to her by someone else.8 7 Therefore, the lay witness
opinion rule reinforces the general rule that a fact witness can testify
only about matters she personally observed.
b. Attorney Finding and "Coaching" of Fact Witnesses
For a fact witness, the attorney's role in the development of testi-
mony lies primarily in locating the witness, not in providing informa-
tion to her. After all, even if a person directly observed critical events,
she cannot possibly become a witness unless one of the attorneys finds
her.
Attorneys use a variety of means to locate witnesses, including re-
viewing accident reports, insurance adjuster files, newspaper articles,
84. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
85. Of course, a single witness may present both fact witness testimony (i.e., testi-
mony based upon her own observations) and expert testimony (i.e., testimony
based, at least in part, upon information provided to the expert).
86. Under Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, "A witness may not testify to a
matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the wit-
ness has personal knowledge of the matter." FED. R. EVID. 602.
87. FED. R. EVID. 701(a). Rule 701 also provides that a fact witness can testify to her
opinions or inferences only when they are "(b) helpful to a clear understanding of
the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based
on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule
702." FED. R. EVID. 701(b)-(c).
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and other documents, hiring private investigators, and even placing
advertisements asking witnesses to contact them. Once witnesses are
located, attorneys or their legal assistants, investigators, or insurance
adjustors interview them and prepare them to testify. Some attorneys
spend considerable time preparing witnesses,8 8 while others are more
reticent about this somewhat controversial practice,8 9 which goes by
such image-filled titles as "coaching,"90 "sand papering," and the espe-
cially colorful "horse shedding"91 of witnesses.
2. Development of Expert Testimony
The fundamental distinction between fact and expert testimony
stems from the information upon which each type of witness can base
her testimony. Unlike fact witnesses, experts are allowed to base
their opinions on information outside of their own observations.
Under Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert is allowed
to base her opinions on data "perceived by or made known to" her. 92
That data can include information that is not admissible as evidence,
including hearsay. 9 3
88. Stephan Landsman, Reforming Adversary Procedure: A Proposal Concerning the
Psychology of Memory and the Testimony of Disinterested Witnesses, 45 U. PrIT.
L. REV. 547, 554 (1984).
89. See Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Note, Professional Conduct and the Preparation of
Witnesses for Trial: Defining the Acceptable Limitations of "Coaching," 1 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 389, 398-409 (1987) (reviewing the "[g]ray [aireas" of witness prep-
aration by attorneys).
90. Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 Mo. L. REV. 699, 744 (1998).
91. Hodes, supra note 27. In my early days as a trial attorney, more experienced
hands explained the alleged origins of this term. As told to me, it derives from
the days when attorneys like Abraham Lincoln would "ride the circuit" from
courthouse to courthouse, drumming up business as they arrived in a new county
seat and immediately preparing for trial. Given limited time, the attorney had to
meet with his witnesses while he was stabling his horse after the ride into town.
Thus, the meetings with witnesses were held in the town stable, which was also
known as the "horse shed."
Frankly, I do not know whether this is an accurate history of this term, but I
like the way the story was told to me, so I am not checking. But see Peter A. Joy
& Kevin C. McMunigal, Witness Preparation: When Does It Cross the Line?, CRIM.
JUST., Fall 2002, at 48, 48 (stating that James Fenimore Cooper popularized this
term). Note, though, that this description of "horse shed" distinguishes the term
from what sounds like, but is not, a synonym, "wood shed." See James M. McEl-
haney, Be Careful in the Woodshed, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2005, at 24, 24. A "wood
shed," as I understand it, is a place where a father would take his children to
discipline them corporally. Thus, the idea of an attorney "wood shedding" her
witness brings to mind a somewhat different image than an attorney "horse shed-
ding" her witness.
92. FED. R. EVID. 703.
93. Id. Technically, the expert can only rely on inadmissible data if it is "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject." Id. In practice, this is not much of a restriction in
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As discussed more fully below, 9a when the expert is retained by
one of the parties or a party's attorney, usually it is the attorney who
decides which data she will "ma[kie known to the expert."95 In this
respect and in several others, the attorney has a significantly larger
role in the development of an expert's testimony than she usually has
in the development of a fact witness's testimony.
a. Methods Used by Attorneys to Mold Expert Testimony
A full understanding of the extent of the attorney's role in the
crafting of the testimony the jury will ultimately hear from an expert
requires an understanding of the many ways in which an attorney
can, and sometimes does, shape expert testimony. Most of these tools
are unavailable or considerably less effective for an attorney who
hopes to shape fact witness testimony.
i. Attorney Selection of Possible Expert Witnesses
An attorney who wants to present expert testimony on a critical
disputed issue can present that testimony from anyone, subject to two
important restrictions. First, the witness must have the "knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education" to qualify her as an expert. 96
Second, she must be willing to work for the attorney at an hourly or
other rate that the client is willing to pay.
Though these limitations occasionally present attorneys with chal-
lenges, usually an attorney has a far greater pool of potential experts
than fact witnesses. Only those persons who actually observed the
critical events at issue are eligible to testify as fact witnesses. By defi-
nition, this is a limited number of persons. Often, it is a rather small
number. In contrast, an attorney can chose any available affordable
expert and provide her with the background information she decides
to provide.
Simply by choosing the "right" expert, an attorney can exercise sig-
nificant influence over the expert testimony the jury will ultimately
hear at trial. Sometimes an attorney who is looking for an expert will
consider only those who not only carry the required credentials, but
who are also likely to reach opinions that are helpful to her client's
the typical case, because the expert simply testifies that she and other experts in
her field rely upon the information that she happens to be relying upon in the
case at hand. The opposing party can challenge this bootstrapping declaration, of
course, but doing so is an uphill and usually losing battle that will require sub-
stantial dedication of resources to determine what types of information experts in
the field typically consider. See Easton, supra note 24, at 488 n.70.
94. See infra subsection IV.A.2.a.iii.
95. FED. R. EVID. 703.
96. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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case. 97 To identify a "dependable" expert, the attorney will often con-
sult with other attorneys who have retained candidate experts in
other cases. 98
ii. Attorney Employment of Expert
After the attorney identifies an expert with qualifying credentials
and rates (and, perhaps, outlook 9 9), she hires that expert on behalf of
her client.' 0 0 From this point until the expert's services end,lOl the
attorney is the expert's boss. Though a retained expert is usually an
independent contractor rather than a full-time employee, the expert
and the attorney are nonetheless in an employment relationship.10 2
As the employee, the expert must continue to please her employer, the
attorney.
Furthermore, the expert-attorney relationship is an "at will" con-
tract. The attorney reserves the right to fire the expert (i.e., discon-
tinue using her services and paying her), at any point. Therefore, an
attorney who wishes to do so (or believes it is in her client's interest to
do so) can exert tremendous influence over a retained expert, simply
by virtue of the inherently coercive nature of their relationship. To
put it bluntly, the expert will continue to earn fees from the case only
as long as her employer, the retaining attorney, continues to believe
that the expert's analysis and opinions are helpful to the client.1O3 If
97. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 652 (1986); Brown et al.,
supra note 1, at 70 (quoting Melvin Belli as saying, "If I got myself an impartial
witness, I'd think I was wasting my money"); John H. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 835 (1985).
98. See Easton, supra note 24, at 493 n.84; cf. Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP.
L. 735, 768-70 (2004) (discussing the economic pressures faced by a repeat expert
witness, who is "heavily invested in pleasing the client so as to maintain prospec-
tive business"); Douglas R. Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts and Compensa-
tion, 67 TENN. L. REV. 909, 940-47 (2000) (discussing the compensation and
biases of "professional," "seasoned" expert witnesses).
99. See supra subsection IV.A.2.a.i.
100. Sometimes the party, rather than the attorney, technically hires and pays the
expert, but this does not change the reality that the attorney serves as the ex-
pert's supervisor. See Easton, supra note 24, at 494 n.88.
101. If the expert reaches opinions that are helpful to the retaining attorney, the em-
ployment relationship between the expert and the attorney may not end until
after the expert testifies at trial and the litigation is resolved. If, on the other
hand, the attorney is no longer pleased with the expert's services, she can fire the
expert at any point. See infra subsection 1V.A.2.a.ii.
102. See Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH.
L. REV. 1605, 1644-45 (1986); Mickus, supra note 26, at 789-90.
103. See Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ICT Group, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 110, 116
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that "the financial incentives that inhere in a 'sympa-
thetic' opinion are undeniable"); Brown et al., supra note 1, at 69 & n.88;
Langbein, supra note 97, at 835 (observing that "the expert can run his meter
only so long as his patron litigator likes the tune"); Mickus, supra note 26, at
789-90; Michael E. Plunkett, Discoverability of Attorney Work Product Reviewed
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the expert reaches opinions that are helpful to the opposing party on
significant matters, the attorney will presumably fire her.O4
Also, at some point in most litigation, the expert becomes a de facto
member of the client's trial team, along with others who are assisting
the attorney like the second chair attorney, legal assistants, investiga-
tors, and the client or its representatives.1o5 Trial teams develop a
fierce loyalty to the client and a bunker mentality that makes them
see the other party and its trial team as enemies.1o 6
Occasionally, non-party fact witnesses occupy a similar position as
trial team members when they have a close positive relationship with
a party because they are the party's spouse, sibling, child, parent, em-
ployee, and so on. Usually, however, a fact witness is not a member of
a trial team.
There should not be any other substantial similarities between or-
dinary fact witnesses and experts as employees of the attorney, be-
cause it is illegal for an attorney to use money to influence fact
witnesses. Under Rule 3.4(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, an attorney cannot "offer an inducement to a witness that is pro-
hibited by law."1o7 Because every American jurisdiction presumably
prohibits bribes to fact witnesses,108 an attorney cannot pay a fact
witness to testify in a manner that is helpful to her client.109 In con-
trast, the Comment to Rule 3.4 of the Model Rules notes that "it is not
improper to ... compensate an expert on witness on terms permitted
by Expert Witnesses: Have the 1993 Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure Changed Anything?, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 482 (1996).
104. See Easton, supra note 41, at 1437-40.
105. Easton, supra note 24, at 497; Langbein, supra note 97, at 835; Mickus, supra
note 26, at 779 (noting concerns about whether experts should "be allowed to play
a role on the litigation team and participate as advocates"); M. Jared Marsh,
Note, State ex rel. Tracy v. Dandurand: Missouri Supreme Court Deals a Blow to
Opinion Work Product Protection, 70 UMKC L. REV. 197, 215 (2001).
106. Cf Richard Horton, Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Opprobrium or Ob-
session?, 349 LANCET 1112, 1112 (1997), quoted in Ellen E. Deason, Court-Ap-
pointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR.
L. REV. 59, 112 (1998) ("Many scientists feel that financial influences are simple
compared to the pervasive challenge of maintaining what they see as an appro-
priate level of intellectual detachment.").
107. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2004); see George C. Harris, Testi-
mony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 6
(2000).
108. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) (2000); see also Harris, supra note 107, at 9 (dis-
cussing "criminal bribery statutes").
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 3 (2004) ("The common law rule in
most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for
testifying . . . ."). In some jurisdictions, attorneys are allowed to pay fact wit-
nesses a standard statutory witness fee, a low standard rate that often is tied to
the low daily fees paid to jurors. However, an attorney cannot make payment of
such a witness fee contingent upon the witness testifying in a manner helpful to
the attorney's client.
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by law." 1 10 Though it may be indelicate to say so,'11 fees paid to a
retained expert are, to a significant extent,112 payments for testimony
that is helpful to the retaining attorney's client because the continued
payment of fees is contingent upon the expert reaching conclusions
that are helpful to that client.
iii. Attorney Control Over the Flow of Information to the
Expert
As previously noted,113 experts are allowed to base their testimony
upon information "made known" to them.114 It is the attorney who
employs and oversees a retained expert's work who makes information
known to the expert, most commonly by sending selected documents to
the expert. 115
Those considering the influence of an attorney over her retained
expert should not be fooled by the seeming neutrality of the "made
known to" provision of Rule 703. As computer professionals who popu-
larized the phrase "garbage in, garbage out" can attest, 11 6 a person
who controls the flow of information to the processor of that informa-
110. Id.; see also Harris, supra note 107, at 1 (listing "fees to expert witnesses" as one
of two exceptions to the general prohibition of "payments to witnesses in return
for testimony").
111. A comment to the Model Rules notes, for example, that in most jurisdictions it is
"improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 3 (2004). Presumably this refers to a fee contingent upon a
certain outcome in the case, because that is what attorneys generally have in
mind when discussing contingent fees. To a certain extent, though, it may also
suggest a ban on expert witness fees that are explicitly stated to be contingent
upon the expert reaching certain opinions. In reality, it is difficult to imagine an
attorney being foolish enough to enter into an agreement with an expert witness
whereby the expert's right to fees was explicitly contingent upon the expert
reaching opinions helpful to the attorney's client. If such an explicit agreement
were reached and opposing counsel became aware of this agreement, it would
become a highlight of that attorney's cross-examination of the expert. Instead, in
the typical attorney-expert employment relationship, both parties realize that
the expert's continued opportunity to earn fees from the case is contingent upon
her reaching opinions helpful to the attorney's client, but this implicit arrange-
ment is not explicitly memorialized, or even stated orally.
112. In the initial period just after the expert is selected and hired by the attorney, the
fees that the expert receives are presumably not contingent upon her reaching an
opinion helpful to the retaining attorney's client. It is presumably expected that
the expert will be paid for her initial review of the materials forwarded to her by
the attorney, regardless of what opinion she reaches. However, to the extent that
the attorney selected a particular expert because she was expected to reach a
conclusion helpful to the attorney's client, see supra subsection IV.A.2.a.i, even
this portion of the expert's fees is related to the expert's (expected) opinions.
113. See supra subsection IV.A.2.
114. FED. R. EVID. 703.
115. TANFORD, supra note 48, at 342; Applegate, supra note 27, at 295-96; Easton,
supra note 24, at 495-96.
116. See Applegate, supra note 27, at 296.
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tion often can influence the outcome of the information processing
simply by selecting what information to provide.1'7
Attorneys vary widely in their approaches to selecting what infor-
mation to provide to their retained experts.' 1 8 Some select informa-
tion carefully in an effort to control the expert's ultimate testimony.119
Others believe that this approach provides their opponents with a rel-
atively easy and effective way to cross-examine the expert to demon-
strate the influence of the attorney over the expert, so they send all or
almost all relevant information to their experts.120
Some might argue that an attorney cannot completely control the
flow of information to the expert, because the expert might choose to
supplement attorney-provided information by conducting her own in-
vestigation or research. While this is theoretically possible, in prac-
tice the attorney often controls even this information acquisition by
the expert, through the attorney's supervision of her expert. The ex-
pert, after all, will be paid only for those services that the attorney
requests or approves. Therefore, before the savvy expert undertakes
her own investigation or research, she will seek the attorney's permis-
sion to conduct these efforts.121
The attorney's ability to censor the information considered by an
expert stands in stark contrast to her inability to control the flow of
information considered by a fact witness. A fact witness can testify
only to those matters that she personally observes.122 In most in-
stances, a fact witness's observation of critical events occurs before lit-
igation commences. When the typical fact witness observes critical
117. Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ICT Group, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 110, 116 (E.D.N.Y.
2002) (recognizing that "an attorney controls the information flow to the expert
and can, therefore, influence the expert's opinion through his decisions about
what to disclose . .. and when to do so"); Lamonds v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
180 F.R.D. 302, 306 (W.D. Va. 1998); Karn v. Ingersoll Rand, 168 F.R.D. 633, 639
(N.D. Ind. 1996) (observing that "counsel can all too easily color the expert's opin-
ion by simply controlling the expert's access to information"); Intermedics, Inc. v.
Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384, 393-94 (N.D. Cal. 1991); In re McCrae, 295 B.R.
676, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2003) (noting that once an attorney has forwarded
documents to her retained expert "to be considered in forming their opinion,
whether or not the expert relies on the documents, the communication will poten-
tially color the expert's opinion"); see TANFORD, supra note 48, at 342; Oishi,
supra note 39, at 878.
118. See TANFORD, supra note 48, at 342-43 (discussing, and criticizing, advice given
by some attorneys to withhold some materials from the expert); Oishi, supra note
39, at 859-60 (discussing two different approaches used by attorneys to provide
information to expert witnesses).
119. TANFORD, supra note 48, at 342-43; Easton, supra note 24, at 499-500.
120. Easton, supra note 24, at 500.
121. Id. at 495.
122. FED. R. EVID. 602, 701; ROGER HAYDOCK & JOHN SONSTENG, EXAMINING WIT-
NESSES: DIRECT, CROSS, AND EXPERT EXAMINATION § 6.03.2 (1994); see supra note
47 and accompanying text.
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events, the attorney usually does not even know that she will someday
become involved in litigation arising from those events, so she has no
way of controlling or even monitoring the flow of information that af-
fects the fact witness's testimony.
iv. Attorney Direction of the Expert's Analysis and
Testimony
The retaining attorney might control more than just the flow of
information to the expert. She also might directly or implicitly tell the
expert how to analyze that information and what conclusions to
reach. 12 3 As an at will employee, the expert who receives orders or
suggestions from the retaining attorney must choose to either conform
to the attorney's wishes and thereby continue to earn fees from the
case, or ignore those wishes and thereby risk being fired.124
It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to know the extent to which
attorneys explicitly direct the work of retained experts because most
direction takes place in sub rosa communications between attorneys
and experts. Many attorneys refrain from communicating in writing
with their experts, choosing instead to communicate orally, via tele-
phone or private meetings, to lessen the chance that their opponents
will become aware of these communications due to written documen-
tation of them.12 5 Even in the presumably relatively rare case where
opposing counsel becomes aware of the communications between an
attorney and her retained expert, it is not likely to become the subject
of a motion or other dispute requiring the court's ruling. Furthermore,
even in those relatively rare cases where the court does make a ruling
regarding attorney-expert communication, the ruling ordinarily will
not find its way into an appellate or other published opinion. There-
fore, reported decisions discussing the extent of attorney direction of
expert analysis and testimony are relatively rare, even though some
level of attorney instruction is presumably not unusual.
Nonetheless, even the relatively rare reported decisions suggest
that, at least sometimes, some attorneys are quite explicit in their in-
structions to their experts. Examples include:
0 In a medical malpractice case that started in typical fashion
with both the doctors and the hospital as defendants, the plaintiffs
expert witnesses originally criticized the doctors, but not the
nurses, whose negligence presumably could lead to a verdict and
123. Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ICT Group, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 110, 116 (E.D.N.Y.
2002); TV-3, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 194 F.R.D. 585, 588 (S.D. Miss. 2000);
Applegate, supra note 27, at 348 n.368; Langbein, supra note 97, at 835.
124. See supra subsection IV.A.2.a.ii.
125. See Applegate, supra note 27, at 344-46; Kathleen Waits, Opinion Work Product:
A Critical Analysis of Current Law and a New Analytical Framework, 73 OR. L.
REV. 385, 444-45 (1994).
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judgment against the hospital. However, after the plaintiff settled
with the doctors, the plaintiffs attorney advised the experts of this
partial settlement, which led to the experts criticizing the nurses,
thereby salvaging the plaintiffs claim against the hospital, at least
until the jury rejected it at trial. 126
9 A defense expert in another medical malpractice case initially
placed blame upon a Dr. Stallworth for a critical miscommunica-
tion, but also testified that he was not qualified to present an opin-
ion about the cause of death. The defense attorney apparently
then engaged in an intensive effort to re-educate the expert. A day
after the initial testimony described above, the expert wrote a new
opinion letter fixing the cause of death and not mentioning Dr.
Stallworth at all.127
a In another case, a plaintiffs attorney wrote a letter to psycholo-
gists outlining the legal standard that would have to be met in or-
der for the plaintiff to present a cognizable claim. The letter then
asked the psychologists "to take into consideration this law in con-
nection with developing their opinions with regard to the causation
of the plaintiffs claimed injuries."128
* Another attorney, perhaps fearful that such an approach would
not be sufficiently direct, wrote the "expert's" report word-for-word,
but apparently realized that it was in the client's interest to hide
this bit of draftsmanship.129 To make it appear that the report
was drafted by the expert rather than the attorney, the attorney
sent the report to the expert with the following instruction at the
top of the first page, in capital letters: "PLEASE HAVE RETYPED
ON YOUR OWN STATIONERY. THANK YOU." Unfortunately
126. The appellate court summarized the events as follows:
Dr. Matthay testified at trial that he did not discover his initial over-
sights with respect to the negligence of the nursing staff until after Ap-
pellants' attorney advised him that Appellants had "resolved their
differences" with Drs. Pratt and Stern. Likewise, Dr. Spielman testified
at trial that he did not discover his oversight with respect to the "blood
gases" until after learning that Appellants had settled their claims
against the doctors. Dr. Spielman further admitted that it was Appel-
lants' attorney who pointed out to him that the repeat blood gases had
not been performed. Thus, Marymount was able to impeach the credibil-
ity of both Dr. Matthay and Dr. Spielman by showing that they changed
their opinions with respect to the negligence of the hospital's employees
only after being informed that Appellants had settled with the doctors-
and that it was Appellants' attorney, not Dr. Spielman, who discovered
Dr. Spielman's "oversight."
Miller ex rel. Monticello Banking Co. v. Marymount Med. Ctr., 125 S.W.3d 274,
280 (Ky. 2004).
127. Kennedy v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp.-Booneville, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 520, 521-22 (N.D.
Miss. 1998).
128. Musselman v. Phillips, 176 F.R.D. 194, 195 (D. Md. 1997).
129. See Occulto v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 125 F.R.D. 611 (D.N.J. 1989).
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for the attorney and the expert, the expert's typist apparently13 0
followed these instructions to the letter, because the version of the
report submitted by the expert started with, that's right, the
phrase "PLEASE HAVE RETYPED ON YOUR OWN STATION-
ERY. THANK YOU."131
This does not, of course, mean that all attorneys are so direct in
their instructions to experts. 132 Some attorneys believe that their cli-
ents are better served when experts conduct a less directed analysis
that is, therefore, less easily cross-examined by an opposing attorney
who wishes to demonstrate that the "expert's" opinion actually
originated with the attorney. 133
v. Attorney Designation of the Expert as a Witness
A final mechanism attorneys use to control the expert witness tes-
timony that is introduced at trial arises out of the disclosure and dis-
covery rules applicable to experts. Except in extraordinary cases, an
attorney is allowed to consult with an expert without ever informing
her opponent that she has engaged in this consultation and, therefore,
without disclosing the identity of the consulted expert. 13 4 As a result,
an attorney will often initially employ an expert as a consultant, even
when she expects to later call her as a witness at trial if the expert
reaches the expected opinions. Only if and when the expert advises
the attorney that she has reached those opinions and is prepared to
testify in a manner that will assist the attorney will the attorney iden-
tify the expert as a possible witness. 13 5
After the attorney decides that she might call the expert as a wit-
ness, she must disclose her identity to her opponent. 13 6 Before that
time, she is under no obligation to identify her, so the opposing party
and the jury will generally receive no information from an expert
when the attorney who retained her decides, before disclosing her,
that she will not use her to present testimony at trial.
The attorney's opportunity to foreclose her opponent and the jury
from receiving information from a person who might be in a position to
provide it is quite different from an attorney's inability to foreclose her
opponent and the jury from hearing from a fact witness. Through dis-
130. It is also perhaps possible that the "expert's" report never was retyped and that
the expert merely adopted the report written by the attorney.
131. Occulto, 125 F.R.D. at 613. For another case where the attorney wrote the first
draft of the "expert's" report, see Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ICT Group,
Inc., 212 F.R.D. 110, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
132. See infra subsection LV.A.2.b.
133. See Easton, supra note 24, at 500 n.114.
134. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(B); Employer's Reinsurance Corp. v. Clarendon Nat'l
Ins. Co., 213 F.R.D. 422, 424-25 (D. Kan. 2003).
135. See Easton, supra note 24, at 499.
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A).
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closure requirements and discovery requests, the attorney usually is
required to disclose the identity of all potential fact witnesses to her
opponent.137 Once a potential fact witness's identity is disclosed, the
opposing attorney usually can interview her and decide whether to
call her as a witness at trial, even if the party who disclosed her iden-
tity would prefer that she not present trial testimony.
b. Variance Among Attorneys Regarding Molding of Expert
Testimony
Although these tools and techniques for shaping expert testimony
are available to all attorneys, one should not assume that all attorneys
are equally heavy handed in their relationships with their experts.138
Though many (or perhaps almost all) attorneys presumably realize
that they have the power to control their expert's analysis and opin-
ions, not all of them exercise that power. 139
As noted previously, some attorneys are quite explicit in telling the
experts how to work on a case and in outlining the opinions they want
the experts to reach.140 Others, however, refrain from this direct ap-
proach because they believe their clients are best served by a more
candid analysis by an expert. Still others are less direct because they
are concerned that a more direct approach might result in expert testi-
mony that is easily impeached through cross-examination questions
designed to inform the jurors that the words they are hearing came
not from the expert, but from the attorney.141
137. See supra subsections III.B.2.a-b; infra note 147 and accompanying text.
138. For a discussion of several different levels of attorney "direction" of testimony, see
JAMES W. JEANS, SR., TRLAL ADVOCACY § 2.4 (2d ed. 1993).
139. See TANFORD, supra note 48, at 342-43 (noting that some attorneys instruct other
attorneys to withhold some potentially relevant information from experts, then
arguing that this 'advice flies in the face of the ethical rules and amounts to
nothing less than a recommendation that you deliberately manufacture false
evidence").
140. See supra subsection IV.A.2.a.iv.
141. As one federal magistrate judge noted, opening up the communications between
the retaining attorney and the expert for review by opposing counsel and, there-
fore, the jury, will have a substantially greater impact on the retaining attorneys
who aggressively shape expert testimony:
[W]hen an attorney hires an expert both the expert's compensation and
his "marching orders" can be discovered and the expert cross-examined
thereon. If the lawyer's "marching orders" are reasonable and fair, the
lawyer and his client have little to fear. If the orders are in the nature of
telling the expert what he is being paid to conclude, appropriate discov-
ery and cross-examination thereon should be the consequence. Such a
ruling is most consistent with an effort to keep expert testimony fair,
reliable and within the bounds of reason.
TV-3, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 194 F.R.D. 585, 588 (S.D. Miss. 2000).
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B. Should Attorneys' Greater Potential Influence on Expert
Testimony Result in Jurors Receiving Less or More
Information From and About Experts than Fac
Witnesses?
Courts, other authorities, and commentators recognize, at least to
a significant extent, the differences in the attorney's role in forming
expert, as opposed to fact, witness testimony. However, they differ
widely in their response to this reality.
1. The Wrong (but All Too Common) Answer:
Jurors Receive Less Information From and About
Expert Witnesses and Retaining Attorneys'
Influences on Their Testimony
One possible response to the attorney's substantial influence over
expert testimony is to say that this large attorney role should result in
less disclosure of the attorney's influence over experts than over fact
witnesses. As noted in more detail below, this view can lead to deci-
sions allowing attorneys to hide their influence over their retained ex-
perts from their opponents and, therefore, from jurors.142 In perhaps
the most extreme application of this view, some courts have even al-
lowed an attorney to prevent her opponent from calling some expert
witnesses to the stand, for fear that allowing such testimony might be
unfair to the party that originally hired and paid the expert. 143
Often those taking this position do so based upon their expansive
view of attorney work product protection'44 and of the extent to which
the system should value a party's financial investment in an expert's
work. Those who hold it believe that it is unfair to punish an attorney
for her work in influencing an expert or to turn a party's investment in
an expert's fees against that party by providing the jury with informa-
tion from or about that expert that the investing party would prefer to
hide from the jury.145 Admittedly, this desire to avoid punishment of a
party or her attorney for investing money, time, and effort has some
basic appeal.
142. See infra section V.A.
143. See infra subsection V.A.4.
144. See Marsh, supra note 105, at 211 (arguing that disclosure of opinion work prod-
uct shared by a retaining attorney with the expert "ignores the important policies
underlying the protection of opinion work product").
145. See, e.g., Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1991); Pinal Creek
Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1228 (D. Ariz. 2004),
depublished by No. CIV 91-1764-PHX-DAE, 2004 WL 1921176 (D. Ariz. Aug. 25,
2004); Ferguson v. Michael Foods, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 408, 409 (D. Minn. 1999); Eas-
ton, supra note 41, at 1466-67.
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2. The Correct Answer:
Jurors Should Receive at Least as Much Information
From and About Expert Witnesses and
Retaining Attorneys' Influences on Their Testimony
Upon further consideration, however, there are several problems
with the idea that a party's investment in an expert should not be
used against that party.14 6 In the first place, this view ignores the
litigation reality that any investment made by a party and any effort
undertaken by an attorney might possibly result in the jury receiving
information that hurts that party. Among the plentiful examples:
e An attorney's investigative search for fact witnesses, financed
by her client, can result in the attorney locating a fact witness who,
as it turns out, presents testimony that is more helpful to the op-
posing party. Nonetheless, the attorney ordinarily will be required
to reveal the identity of the fact witness to opposing counsel when
responding to a standard interrogatory, 14 7 and opposing counsel
has the right to call her as a witness at trial.
* When an attorney asks a fact witness a question at a deposition
that her opponent would never have thought to ask, the answer to
that question might help her opponent. 1 48 Nonetheless, if the an-
swer is relevant, the attorney cannot hope to be successful at trial
by objecting on the grounds that she asked the question at the dep-
osition and she therefore has the right to prevent the jury from
hearing the answer.' 49
146. See Norfin, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 74 F.R.D. 529, 533 (D. Colo. 1977)
(labeling "the argument that it is 'unfair' for one party to" benefit from the other
party's expenditures for expert fees "unpersuasive"); Seven-Up Bottling Co. v.
United States, 39 F.R.D. 1, 1 (D. Colo. 1966) (rejecting the argument that a
party's expenditures for expert fees gives him the right to prevent the expert from
testifying because the argument "is inconsistent with our basic assumption that
the trial is a search for truth and not a tactical contest which goes to either the
richest or the most resourceful litigant").
147. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c) (providing that an interrogatory "may relate to any mat-
ters which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b)(1)"). Rule 26(b)(1), in turn, al-
lows parties to "obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is
relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including... the identity and loca-
tion of persons having knowledge of any discoverable manner." FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). Thus, each party can, and presumably almost universally will, serve the
opposing party with a standard interrogatory requiring the opposing party to re-
veal the identity of witnesses who know anything about the case, including those
whose testimony will be harmful to the party being forced to disclose the witness.
148. See MALONE & HOFFMAN, supra note 70, § 2.1.1 (noting that one of an attorney's
objectives in taking a deposition is to ask questions to find out what the attorney
does not know); Edward G. Connette, How to Take Better Depositions and Per-
haps Improve Your Marriage, LITIG., Spring 2005, at 6, 6.
149. See THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL § 6.11.2.a (3d ed. 1995) (noting that a party who
takes a deposition may reveal and preserve, for the opponent's use, unfavorable
testimony); see also PAUL M. LISNEK & MICHEAL J. KAUFMAN, DEPOSITIONS: PRO-
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* Similarly, when an attorney asks a witness a question at trial,
she might get an unexpected answer that hurts her client's case.
Nonetheless, she cannot move to strike the answer as "unexpect-
edly harmful" to her case and, therefore, unfair to her client be-
cause her client is paying the fees of the attorney who asked the
question. 150
In these and other instances, a party's initial investment in the secur-
ing of evidence is turned against that party, because the evidence de-
veloped through that investment ultimately hurts the party that made
the investment when it is introduced at trial.
In addition, attorney work product concerns are overstated by
those who would give jurors less information from and about retained
experts.15 1 The attorney work product doctrine is designed to protect
an attorney's unpublished thoughts, so that the attorney has the
chance to consider how best to represent her client.152 This gives the
attorney a chance to consider options and learn about the matters at
issue without thereby creating evidence that could be used against her
client. As long as the attorney keeps her thoughts to herself or shares
them only with those who will not be witnesses, those thoughts should
CEDURE, STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUE § 1.3(13), at 1-4 (1990) (noting that the risk of
preservation of "testimony harmful to the lawyer's case which might otherwise
have been unavailable at the time of trial" is one of the disadvantages of taking a
deposition).
150. Of course, the attorney might be able to prove that the witness's unexpectedly
bad answer is inconsistent with the witness's previous statements, thereby sug-
gesting that the current answer is incorrect. See supra text accompanying note
64. However, this course of action does not erase the witness's unexpected an-
swer to the question at trial.
151. Important commentators have noted that work product concerns can be over-
stated, particularly by the attorneys who would benefit from them. Professor
Waits warned that "work product justifications should be approached with great
skepticism. Lawyers have powerful, self-serving reasons for wanting all forms of
work product protected." Waits, supra note 125, at 433. Similarly, Professor
Thornburg asserted that "work product immunity is not needed to protect the
adversary system or the legal profession," that "it results in suppression of rele-
vant" data, that it leads to unnecessary costs for courts and litigants, and that it
"works to benefit institutional litigants at the expense of individual litigants and
to benefit frequent litigants at the expense of 'one-shot' litigants." Elizabeth
Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, 77 VA. L. REv. 1515, 1517 (1991).
152. See Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ICT Group, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 110, 117
(E.D.N.Y. 2002); FDIC v. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, No. 91-2791-CIV-HURLEY,
1991 WL 836318, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (stating that allowing the retaining attor-
ney to share work product with a testifying expert without disclosing the work
product would "put opposing counsel at a serious disadvantage ... without signif-
icantly bolstering the principal interests the work product doctrine is intended to
advance"); Gall v. Jamison, 44 P.3d 233, 240 (Colo. 2002); Oishi, supra note 39, at
879.
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be protected from disclosure to opposing counsel.153 Once those
thoughts are disclosed to a witness who might testify at trial, how-
ever, the attorney is no longer affecting only her own work and is,
instead, influencing those who might present testimony that the ju-
rors will consider. 154 Disclosure of the influence of an attorney upon a
153. See Baum v. Vill. of Chittenango, 218 F.R.D. 36, 40 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that
"an attorney can protect his work by electing not to disclose it"); Mfg. Admin. &
Mgmt. Sys., 212 F.R.D. at 117.
154. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(finding evidence that an attorney's notes, which were given to the expert wit-
ness, "had 'an impact upon the testimony of the witness'"); Waits, supra note 125,
at 440-41 ("The attorney's opinions are irrelevant only as long as they remain in
the attorney's head or files. Once those thoughts are shared with an expert wit-
ness, they may well become part of the witness's thoughts about the case, a highly
relevant subject.").
Some courts have held that an attorney's sharing of an item otherwise pro-
tected by either the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine with
any third party automatically waives the protection that previously attached to
the item shared. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Audiotext Communications Network, Inc. v. US Telecom, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 250,
253 (D. Kan. 1996); CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE 367-68 (2d ed. 1994) (referencing such decisions but voicing disagreement
with them). Other courts distinguish between the two types of protection by
holding that disclosure of items protected by the attorney-client privilege to any
third party automatically waives the privilege, but disclosure of items protected
by the work product doctrine waives the privilege only if this sharing is inconsis-
tent with the attorney's maintenance of secrecy, because the sharing with that
third party increases the possibility of the opposing party obtaining the informa-
tion. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d
Cir. 1991); Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 7689(HB),
2004 WL 2389822, at *4-*8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 26, 2004); Lugosch v. Congel, 219
F.R.D. 220, 240-41 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Cent. Green Co. v. United States, No. CV F
96-5541 REC SMS, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26526, at *27-*36 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24,
2003); WRIGHT ET AL., supra, at 369 (arguing that this is the preferable approach
to waiver of work product protection); Amy L. Fischer, The Attorney-Client/ Work
Product Privileges and Surety Investigative Information: Applying Old Rules to
Turn New Tricks, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1009, 1027-28 & nn.88-89 (1999).
In my view, under either doctrine regarding waiver of work product protec-
tion, an attorney's sharing of a document with a person that the attorney lists as
a person likely to testify at trial should be considered a waiver of work product
protection. If sharing with any third person is a waiver, sharing with an expert
witness is a waiver. Even if sharing with a third person is a waiver only if it
increases the likelihood of a loss of secrecy, sharing with a person listed as an
expert witness should qualify. Although there is room for disagreement, one
could argue that sharing with almost any person who is reasonably likely to be-
come a witness at trial, other than the client, is inconsistent with secrecy, be-
cause the witness might: communicate with the opposing counsel and, in doing
so, reveal the existence of the item, see supra subsection III.B.2.c; be deposed and
disclose the existence of the document in response to a deposition question, see
supra subsection III.B.2.a; or be called to the stand at trial and disclose the exis-
tence of the document in response to a trial question, possibly due to the general
evidence law rule requiring a witness to disclose items used to refresh her recol-
lection, see FED. R. EVID. 612; Audiotext Communications Network, 164 F.R.D. at
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witness does nothing to interfere with the right of an attorney to rumi-
nate about a case and even to discuss it with an expert who is merely
consulted155 and never identified as a potential trial witness. 15 6 The
attorney who wishes to preserve the privacy of her thoughts simply
must preserve the privacy of her thoughts, by keeping those thoughts
to herself or to her non-testifying consultant.
Finally, and most importantly, those who would provide the jurors
with less information from and about experts than about fact wit-
nesses have recognized the importance of money in the development of
expert testimony, but have drawn the incorrect conclusion about how
the civil justice system should react to the influence of money and the
attorney who controls its flow. To be sure, parties pay experts with
the hope, or even the expectation, that they will reach opinions helpful
to them, and attorneys may guide them to those opinions. However,
due to the powerful influence of money and the person who controls its
flow, instead of providing less information about the expert and the
retaining attorney's influence on her opinion, courts should provide at
least as much, if not more, information about the attorney-expert re-
lationship as they do about the attorney-fact witness relationship.15 7
Outside of the expert witness context, courts and other authorities
are ordinarily very concerned about the potentially corrupting influ-
ence of money on the testimony of witnesses. 158 That, indeed, is why
legislatures and courts have prohibited the bribing of fact witnesses
252 (granting motion to compel production, despite work product claims, of docu-
ments allegedly used by the witness "to prepare for his deposition, to refresh his
memory, and to change previous testimony"); Berkey Photo, 74 F.R.D. at 615.
Disclosure to an expert witness is even more inconsistent with continued expecta-
tions of privacy, particularly in federal cases and cases in states with rules pat-
terned after Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because Rule 26 and
the official comments of those who wrote it provide that the expert must divulge
all items she considered. See infra note 195.
155. See, e.g., Security Ins. Co. v. Trustmark Ins. Co., 218 F.R.D. 29, 31-32 (D. Conn.
2003); Miller ex rel. Monticello Banking Co. v. Marymount Med. Ctr., 125 S.W.3d
274, 284 (Ky. 2004).
156. Except in unusual circumstances, an opposing party is not entitled to discover
information (including information about an attorney's communications with the
expert) relating to an expert who is never identified as a trial witness. See FED.
R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
157. See Oishi, supra note 39, at 878; cf. Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., 212 F.R.D. at 117
(arguing that mitigating the advocacy of the expert by allowing discovery of, and
therefore cross-examination based upon, the retaining attorney's use of work
product to influence the expert is "desirable"); TV-3, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am.,
194 F.R.D. 585, 588 (S.D. Miss. 2000).
158. See Harris, supra note 107, at 73 ("The potential for perjury or shaped testimony
when witnesses are selected, prepared, and compensated by one party to litiga-
tion is self-evident and substantial. The ethical rules condemn such payments
generally for this reason.").
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through the payment of fees beyond the minimal standard witness
fees and travel expenses.159
The allowance of hourly or other fees to experts should be seen as a
reluctant concession to the reality that jurors will not have the benefit
of expert witness testimony unless experts are paid for their services.
In the American system, where parties are primarily or exclusively
responsible for finding, developing, and introducing evidence,160 ex-
perts typically will not testify unless the parties are allowed to pay
them an hourly or other rate for their work on the case. In other
words, while it would perhaps be nice in an ideal world to enforce the
prohibition against hourly or other fees to all witnesses, including ex-
perts, realists recognize that jurors often need expert testimony to
help them analyze difficult technical issues, so we have to tolerate
parties paying experts.
Thus, expert witness fees should be grudgingly tolerated as a nec-
essary evil that potentially taints the system, not celebrated as some-
thing that gives the party who pays them rights above and beyond
those a party maintains with respect to fact witnesses. The part of us
that recognizes that paying fees to fact witnesses could affect their
testimony should recognize that paying fees to experts could affect
their testimony. When this is coupled with recognition of the retain-
ing attorney's power to control the flow of fees and therefore to mold
the expert's testimony,161 we should see the need to provide jurors
with as much information as possible regarding the attorney's mold-
ing efforts. 162
As in many other situations, some will be tempted to respond with
a version of, "Everybody does it, so what's the big deal?" In the re-
tained expert witness context in civil litigation, this argument would
be phrased as, "Because every attorney shapes expert testimony, why
waste the jurors' time detailing the influence of the attorney?" There
are, of course, several responses.
Most importantly, it is not clear that "everybody does it," at least to
the same degree. As noted above, some attorneys are very direct and
explicit in giving orders to their experts, while others exercise consid-
erably less of their potential influence. 163 Because we ordinarily
value evidence about the extent of a particular attorney's influence
over a witness as information jurors can use to evaluate the witness's
159. See supra subsection IV.A.2.a.ii.
160. Deason, supra note 106, at 61; Mickus, supra note 26, at 780 (noting the Ameri-
can belief "that the truth-finding process will best be served by presenting to the
jury competing views of the litigated case").
161. See supra subsection IV.A.2.a.ii.
162. Cf Harris, supra note 107, at 74 ("[A]ll reasonable measures should be taken to
guard against biased testimony . ").
163. See supra subsections IV.A.2.a.iv, b.
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testimony, 164 we would expect and, indeed, desire that jurors treat the
testimony of an expert who is merely mouthing the words written by
the attorney with more skepticism than the testimony of an opposing
expert who was not so substantially guided. 16 5 As a frequently cited
magistrate judge familiar with the potential of an attorney to control
her expert acerbically stated, the jury "has a right to know who is [re-
ally] testifying."166
In addition, there are cases where it is not correct to claim that
"everybody does it," because every party does not call an expert to tes-
tify in every case. Though we paradigmatically think that every ex-
pert in a given field is matched by an opposing expert from the same
field,167 a party might not call an expert to testify even though her
opponent has called an expert (or will do so when she later presents
her case in chief). Though there might be strategic concerns that can
lead to this decision,168 perhaps the most common reason for not call-
ing an expert to respond to the opposing party's expert is that a party
simply cannot afford to pay the fees that an expert would charge. In
any instance where only one of the parties calls an expert in a given
field, the suggestion that the other party will somehow roughly bal-
ance out the influence of money and attorney control over the only
expert called to the stand is fallacious. When a party who will not call
164. See supra section III.A.
165. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n v. Fields, 75 P.3d 1088, 1101 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003) (noting the value of "permitting a party to explore whether an opposing
expert's opinion originated with an attorney"); cf. Waits, supra note 125, at 441
(noting that, whether an attorney's biased communication to an expert witness
"is blatant or subtle,... it raises important concerns about the expert witness's
credibility").
166. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384, 395-96 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ("[I]t
would be fundamentally misleading, and could do great damage to the integrity
of the truth finding process, if testimony that was being presented as the inde-
pendent thinking of an 'expert' in fact was the product, in whole or significant
part, of the suggestions of counsel."); see also Barna v. United States, No.
95 C 6552, 1997 WL 417847, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 1997); Karn v. Ingersoll
Rand, 168 F.R.D. 633, 640 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
167. See supra section II.A.
168. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Minimalist Approach to the Presentation of Expert
Testimony, 31 STETSON L. REV. 105, 109-12 (2001) (explaining that it is some-
times better for an attorney to refrain from calling an expert, perhaps even when
the opposing party has done so).
In some circumstances, an attorney might plan to argue that a particular type
of expert, such as an economist testifying about the net present value of damages
in a personal injury case, has nothing of importance to add to the case. See
Thomas R. Ireland, A Corrective Note on the Role of a Defense Economist in Per-
sonal Injury I Wrongful Death Litigation, J. LEGAL ECON., July 1993, at 95, 95;
Lawrence M. Spizman, The Defense Economist's Role in Litigation Settlement Ne-
gotiations, J. LEGAL ECON., Fall 1995, at 57, 58. An attorney planning to make
such an argument might decide not to call her own economist to the stand, be-
cause doing so implies that an economist's testimony is of some value in the case.
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her own expert wishes to challenge the testimony of the only expert
who testifies, she should be armed with as much reasonably available
information as possible about the influence of the retaining attorney.
Providing anything less further handicaps parties who cannot afford
expert witness fues.
Finally, even in those cases where "everybody does it" about
equally, evidence about the influence of both attorneys over their ex-
perts is potentially valuable to jurors. Recall that, when the experts
take opposite positions on questions of fact that can have only one cor-
rect answer, one of the experts is testifying incorrectly. 16 9 When ju-
rors receive information about the influence of that expert's employer,
they may come to understand why the expert is testifying incorrectly.
Of course, the influence of money and the related attorney control
over experts do not always lead to incorrect testimony. The expert
opinion that an attorney uses her client's funds to purchase may in-
deed be the correct opinion. However, the same can be said about all
bias evidence about the relationship between a witness and one of the
parties or attorneys.170 Nonetheless, we believe that bias evidence
will help jurors evaluate fact witness testimony often enough to make
it relevant and admissible. Given the power of attorneys to exercise
more control over experts than fact witnesses, we should provide ju-
rors with at least as much information about that influence.171 Jurors
will get this information in cross or otherwise only if opposing attor-
neys are allowed to obtain it.172 Unfortunately, when push comes to
shove, courts and other authorities sometimes prevent attorneys from
obtaining or using information from and about experts that they allow
with regard to fact witnesses.
V. THE SOLUTION:
APPLYING ORDINARY WITNESS RULES
TO EXPERT WITNESSES
In several respects, the language of discovery and disclosure rules
seems to provide for equivalent revelation of information about fact
witnesses and experts. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure require a party to disclose the identities of fact witnesses 73 and
169. See supra subsection II.A.2.
170. See supra subsection III.A.2.a.
171. See Miller ex rel. Monticello Banking Co. v. Marymount Med. Ctr., 125 S.W.3d
274, 280 (Ky. 2004) (noting that bias evidence is relevant in affirming trial court's
admission of such evidence regarding an expert).
172. See supra section III.B.
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A). In states that do not have automatic disclosure provi-
sions, a party could obtain similar information by addressing an interrogatory to
the opposing party asking her to identify persons with information about a criti-
cal event. See supra subsection III.B.2.b.
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of those experts who might testify at trial.X7 4 Also, a litigant can de-
pose both potential fact witnesses and disclosed expert witnesses.175
In one respect, the disclosure rules provide for even more informa-
tion about experts that an attorney has decided that she might call as
trial witnesses. Perhaps in recognition of an attorney's close relation-
ship with a retained expert, federal (and some state 76 ) disclosure
rules require a retained expert to provide a report outlining the opin-
ions she will express, her bases for these opinions, the "data or other
information" she considered in forming her opinions, exhibits she will
use, her qualifications, her compensation, and a list of cases where she
recently testified. 177 Other than the automatic disclosure nature of
this report, however, these requirements are not drastically different
for experts and fact witnesses, because attorneys could demand simi-
lar information through interrogatories to parties aligned with fact
witnesses 178 or through deposition questions to fact witnesses. 179
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A). In a few states, a party is required to automatically
disclose the identity of expert witnesses who might testify at trial. See Easton,
supra note 24, at 530 n.185. In others, parties can issue interrogatories that re-
quire their opponents to list expert witnesses who might testify at trial. See id.
175. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(a)(1) (permitting the deposition "of any person"); FED. R. Civ. P.
31(a)(2) (similarly permitting the deposition upon written questions "of any
person").
In many, but not all, states, the discovery rules provide explicit authority for a
party in a civil case to demand to depose expert and other witnesses. See Easton,
supra note 24, at 530 n.185. In some jurisdictions where the rules do not explic-
itly provide the right to depose expert witnesses, parties traditionally agree to
allow opposing counsel to depose expert witnesses. See Stephen D. Easton, Can
We Talk?: Removing Counterproductive Ethical Restraints Upon Ex Parte Com-
munication Between Attorneys and Adverse Expert Witnesses, 76 IND. L.J. 647,
694 & n.178 (2001).
176. See, e.g., UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i); see also COLO.
R. Crv. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I) (requiring report to accompany automatic disclosure, but
providing no explicit requirement that the expert, rather than counsel, write the
report).
Many states do not require testifying experts to write expert witness reports,
but provide information about expert witnesses through other mechanisms. See,
e.g., ARiz. R. Civ. P. 26. 1(a)(6) (requiring automatic disclosure only of "[ t ]he name
and address of each person whom the disclosing party expects to call as an expert
witness at trial, the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, a
summary of the grounds for each opinion, the qualifications of the witness and
the name and address of the custodian of copies of any reports prepared by the
expert," but not mandating preparation of such a report); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§ 2034.410 (West 2005) (allowing depositions of experts listed by other parties);
WASH. SuP. CT. Civ. R. 26(b)(5)(A) (allowing a party to issue an interrogatory
asking for information like that outlined in the Arizona rule and allowing deposi-
tions of expert witnesses the opposing party expects to call at trial); MICH. R. Civ.
P. 2.302(B)(4) (similar to Washington).
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
178. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
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However, despite the roughly equivalent rules about fact witnesses
and experts, when courts have resolved disclosure, discovery, informa-
tion-gathering, and admissibility disputes about experts, they some-
times provide for significantly less information from and about experts
than about fact witnesses. This deprives jurors of the types of infor-
mation that they routinely receive regarding fact witnesses and,
therefore, can potentially lead to incorrect decisions that might not
occur if jurors received this information. 180 Fortunately, courts can
easily correct this problem by simply applying the rather firmly estab-
lished rules for supplying fact witness information to expert
witnesses.
A. Information that Should Be, but Sometimes Is Not,
Provided to Jurors to Help Them Resolve Disputes
Between Expert Witnesses
The narrower scope of expert information provided to opposing
counsel and, therefore, to jurors, takes place in several contexts where
similar information is routinely provided for fact witnesses. In my
view, these distinctions cannot be justified by the language of the dis-
closure, discovery, or evidence rules or standard doctrines. Further-
more, because jurors need at least as much evidence about the
influence of attorneys and parties on experts as they do about the in-
fluence of attorneys and parties on fact witnesses, these distinctions
also cannot be justified on public policy grounds.1s1
1. Information About Problems with an Expert's Opinions
Information about problems with an expert's scientific or other
technical analysis is the rough equivalent of problems with a fact wit-
ness's opportunity or ability to observe critical events and remember
179. FED. R. Crv. P. 30(a)(1) (permitting the deposition "of any person"); FED. R. Civ. P.
31(a)(2) (similarly permitting the deposition upon written questions "of any per-
son"). Many state discovery rules also allow depositions of expert witnesses. See
supra note 175.
180. See Oishi, supra note 39, at 878-79 (noting the importance of effective cross-ex-
amination and, therefore, widespread discovery and disclosure of the retaining
attorney's influence on the expert witness); see also Am. Fid. Assurance Co. v.
Boyer, 225 F.R.D. 520, 522 (D.S.C. 2002); Gall v. Jamison, 44 P.3d 233, 240 (Colo.
2002).
181. Cf Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n v. Fields, 75 P.3d 1088, 1101 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003) (noting that "Arizona has a long-favored practice of allowing full
cross-examination of expert witnesses, including inquiry about the expert's
sources, relations with the hiring party and counsel, possible bias, and prior opin-
ions" and noting the link between open discovery and effective cross-examination
about these matters); Miller ex rel. Monticello Banking Co. v. Marymount Med.
Ctr., 125 S.W.3d 274, 282-84 (Ky. 2004) (noting the importance of providing the
jurors with information about the relationship between parties and expert
witnesses).
[Vol. 84:675
ENHANCING DAUBERT EXCLUSION
them. For both experts and fact witnesses, such information suggests
problems with the witness's testimony. For both types of witnesses, it
is readily admitted.
The difference in treatment of experts and fact witnesses lies, as it
so often does, not in the admissibility of this information if the oppos-
ing attorney somehow finds it, but in her opportunities to find it. For
one means of acquiring this information, formal discovery, there is no
distinction, because opposing attorneys can explore these matters in
discovery, especially with deposition questions to the witness. For an-
other means of acquiring it, self-help information gathering, several
courts and other authorities distinguish between fact witnesses and
experts.
Even though direct ex parte contact with opposing fact witnesses is
routine and encouraged by the professional responsibility rules,1 8 2
some courts and other professional responsibility authorities have
precluded direct ex parte contact with opposing retained experts. 18 3
These decisions result from a failure to recognize that, except in a few
states, 184 nothing in either the civil procedure or professional respon-
sibility rules prohibits ex parte contact between attorneys and oppos-
ing retained experts. They also suffer from a failure to recognize that,
if an attorney is not allowed to contact any type of witness ex parte,
the jurors will probably be deprived of any information that the attor-
ney would have acquired through ex parte contact, because the attor-
ney will not risk asking a cross-examination question with an
182. The official comment to the professional responsibility rule prohibiting an attor-
ney from even asking most witnesses not to communicate with that attorney's
opposing counsel notes the importance of allowing both parties to access potential
evidence, including the testimony of witnesses:
The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence
in a case is to be marshalled competitively by the contending parties.
Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions
against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing
witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 1 (2004); see also Int'l Bus. Machs.
Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting the "time-honored and
decision-honored principles .. .that counsel for all parties have a right to inter-
view an adverse party's witnesses (the witness willing) in private, without the
presence or consent of opposing counsel"), quoted in Bobele v. Superior Court, 199
Cal. App. 3d 708, 713 (1988).
183. Cramer v. Sabine Transp. Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 727, 731 (S.D. Tex. 2001); see
Easton, supra note 175, at 699; cf. Zeidler v. A & W Rests., Inc., No. 99 C 2591,
2001 WL 561367, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2001) (declaring a controversy regard-
ing ex parte communications between expert and initially adverse counsel moot,
but indicating that, "as a matter of prudence, [counsel] should have sought gui-
dance from the Court before communicating with [the expert] regarding any mat-
ter of substance").
184. Two states that prohibit ex parte contact by rule are Idaho, see IDAHO R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4); Easton, supra note 175, at 699, and Texas, see Cramer, 141 F. Supp. 2d
at 731.
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unknown answer.1 8 5 In the absence of a prohibition of ex parte con-
tact in the rules, an attorney who believes that it is in her client's
interest to make ex parte contact with an opposing retained expert
should be allowed to make such contact.1 8 6
2. Information About the Expert's Relationships with a Party or
Attorney
Opposing parties and, therefore, jurors, receive roughly equivalent
information about some aspects of some fact or expert witnesses' rela-
tionships with sponsoring parties and their attorneys. For both a fact
witness and an expert called by the party that originally expected to
call her, the opposing party can discover and therefore introduce1 8 7
information about the friendly, unfriendly, or familial relationship be-
tween a witness and a party or attorney.1 8 Similarly, for both a fact
witness and an expert called by the party that initially expected to call
her, the opposing party would be allowed to discover information
about payments or other favors the party bestowed upon her.18 9
185. The attorney ordinarily will not ask a cross-examination question if she does not
know the answer to that question. See supra subsection III.B.1. If the attorney is
not allowed to contact the opposing expert ex parte, she may not learn informa-
tion that would have been acquired in that contact. With regard to this data that
would have been learned by the attorney through ex parte contact, then, disal-
lowing ex parte contact ordinarily will lead not just to the attorney not learning
this information, but to the jurors not learning it.
186. For a more complete and nuanced discussion of the issue of attorney ex parte
contact with opposing experts, see Easton, supra note 175.
187. MAUET & WOLFSON, supra note 50, § 12.3(b); 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 47, § 39.
188. Such relationships between experts and parties and attorneys might be some-
what less common than relationships between parties and fact witnesses, but
they are not extraordinary. For example, a defendant manufacturer in a product
liability case might retain an engineer who formerly worked for it, a hospital in a
medical malpractice case might retain a physician who formerly worked for it, or
a corporation in an employment discrimination case might retain its former
human resources director.
189. Discovery about the relationship between a fact witness and a party and about
any favors bestowed by a party upon a fact witness presumably would take place
via interrogatories directed to the party, see FED. R. Civ. P. 33, and deposition
questions directed to the witness, see FED. R. Civ. P. 30, 31. Such matters seem
well within the broad scope of discovery in civil cases, which permits discovery
about "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any
party." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Discovery about the relationship between an expert and a party, including the
extent of the payments made to the expert by the party, would be facilitated by
the required expert report of "the compensation to be paid for [the expert's] study
and testimony." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Again, interrogatories to the party
and deposition questions to the witness would be the primary discovery tools
used to further explore these matters. Questions about such issues are within
the allowable limits of discovery regarding all matters that must be disclosed
about experts. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(5).
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Again, however, some1 9 0 courts provide opposing parties with less
information about an attorney's influences upon a retained expert,
even when the party that initially expected to call her to the stand
does call her to the stand. Under the rubric of protection of attorney
work product,19 1 these courts incorrectly allow a retaining attorney to
hide some or all of the communications between her and her expert,
including the attorney's disclosure of her work product to the ex-
pert.19 2 As previously explained,193 such decisions overextend and
misapply the doctrine of attorney work product.194 Once an attorney
shares her work product with a witness whose testimony might be af-
fected by that work product, the attorney can no longer claim that only
her private thoughts are at issue. 195 This is why courts routinely al-
190. The cases are not uniform. See Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ICT Group,
Inc., 212 F.R.D. 110, 113-14 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Pavlak v. Dyer, 59 Pa. D. & C.4th
353, 361 (C.P. Ct. of Pikes County 2003) (noting the "split" among federal courts
about whether an attorney waives work product protection by showing her work
product to a testifying expert); Marsh, supra note 105, at 201-11 (reviewing con-
flicting state and federal cases); Oishi, supra note 39, at 861, 865-66, 869-77
(reviewing the 'split of authority" among federal courts); see also Waits, supra
note 125, at 397-423 (discussing cases decided before the 1993 amendment to
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
191. Estate of Chopper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 195 F.R.D. 648 (S.D. Iowa 2000);
Moore v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 194 F.R.D. 659 (S.D. Iowa 2000); Helton v.
Kincaid, No. CA2004-08-099, 2005 WL 1324729, at *3-*4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 6,
2005); see also, e.g., Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., 212 F.R.D. at 114 (noting that
courts that protect work product from discovery even after an attorney communi-
cates it to an expert witness do so to protect "core attorney work product"); TV-3,
Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 194 F.R.D. 585, 588-89 (S.D. Miss. 2000); Pavlak, 59
Pa. D. & C.4th at 353.
192. E.g., Smith v. Transducer Tech., Inc., 197 F.R.D. 260 (D.V.I. 2000); Estate of
Chopper, 195 F.R.D. 648; Moore, 194 F.R.D. 659; Alliant Hospitals, Inc. v. Ben-
ham, 105 S.W.3d 473, 476-77 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003); Helton, 2005 WL 1324729, at
*3-*4; Pavlak, 213 Pa. D. & C.4th at 354-55; see Easton, supra note 24, at 534-36
& nn.206, 209 & 213-16, 540-43 & nn.233, 238.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 151-56.
194. See Palmer v. Asarco, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 258, 261 (N.D. Okla. 2004) (noting that
"[any type of work product or other privilege is lost when the material is dis-
closed to and considered by a testifying expert"); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. In-
terlogix, Inc., No. 01 C 6157, 2002 WL 653893, at *3 (N.D. Ill. April 19, 2002)
(stating that "[clommunications between a testifying expert and the party retain-
ing that expert are not privileged"); Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., 212 F.R.D. at
115-16 (rejecting the contention that an attorney can share work product with an
expert without waiving work product protection).
For a detailed discussion of the extent to which courts should provide parties
with full access to work product that a retaining attorney forwards to an expert,
see Easton, supra note 24.
195. Several courts have held that an attorney who shares her work product with an
expert witness has waived the protection of the work product doctrine and must
disclose the shared work product with opposing counsel. E.g., Am. Fid. Assur-
ance Co. v. Boyer, 225 F.R.D. 520 (D.S.C. 2004); Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co.,
No. 99 Civ. 9033 RCCHBP, 2004 WL 1746772 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2004); Baum v.
Vill. of Chittenango, 218 F.R.D. 36 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); S. Scrap Metal Co. v. Flem-
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low cross-examining attorneys to explore the extent to which the di-
rect examiner has coached a fact witness despite any readily
discredited claims an attorney might assert that anything she said in
coaching her fact witness was her work product. 196
ing, No. Civ.A. 01-2554, 2003 WL 21474516, at *20-*21 (E.D. La. June 18, 2003);
Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., 212 F.R.D. at 115-16 (holding that "the text of Rule
26 mandates disclosure of work product given to a testifying expert" and that "the
sharing of materials with an expert designated to testify establishes a waiver of
any protection associated with the information"); Herman v. Marine Midland
Bank, 207 F.R.D. 26, 28-30 (W.D.N.Y. 2002); Aniero Concrete Co. v. N.Y. City
Sch. Constr. Auth., No. 94CIV.9111CSHFM, 2002 WL 257685 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22,
2002); W. Res., Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 00-2043-CM, 2002 WL 181494 (D.
Kan. Jan. 31, 2002) (requiring disclosure of work product considered by expert
while working as a testifying witness, but not while working as a consultant),
cited by Monsanto Co. v. Aventis Cropscience, 214 F.R.D. 545, 546-48 (E.D. Mo.
2002); TV-3, 194 F.R.D. 585; In re McCrae, 295 B.R. 676, 678 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
2003); Gall v. Jamison, 44 P.3d 233 (Colo. 2002); Wilson v. Rogers, No. CL98-
1676, 2000 WL 33340681 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 18, 2000); see also Easton, supra note
24, at 534 nn.202-04, 538-40 nn.228-29 & 231 (citing and discussing pre-2000
cases); Stephen D. Easton & Franklin D. Romines, Dealing with Draft Dodgers:
Automatic Production of Drafts of Expert Witness Reports, 22 REV. LITIG. 355, 371
n.68 (2003) (citing additional recent cases).
Often the recent decisions point to the language of Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Advisory Committee notes accompanying this
rule. E.g., Am. Fid. Assurance Co., 225 F.R.D. at 521; Zheng, 2004 WL 1746772
at *1-*2; Baum, 218 F.R.D. at 39; McCrae, 295 B.R. at 678 (noting that "the plain
meaning of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) trumps protection afforded by the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine" once protected materials, including at-
torney work product, are shown to a testifying expert); cf. Gall, 44 P.3d at 234
(holding, in a case decided under a state rule similar to the federal rule, that
"[t]he plain language of the amended Rule, the accompanying advisory commit-
tee's note, policy considerations, and the weight of authority compel the conclu-
sion that priviliged materials lose their privileged status when disclosed to, and
considered by, a testifying expert"). A 1993 amendment to Rule 26 added a provi-
sion requiring a retained expert witness to produce a report disclosing, among
other listed items, "the data or information considered by the witness in forming
the opinions" in the case. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). While drafting the 1993
amendment, the United States Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee added
a note stating that, with the addition of the requirement of a report of matters
considered by the expert, "litigants should no longer be able to argue that materi-
als furnished to their experts to be used in forming their opinions-whether or
not ultimately relied on by the expert-are privileged or otherwise protected from
disclosure." FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(2) advisory committee's note (1993). As a mem-
ber of the Advisory Committee recently noted, the Advisory Committee devotes
"considerable attention" to their notes, because judges often rely upon them in
resolving controversies arising under the rules. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square
Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil Discov-
ery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 29 (2001).
196. See Minebea Co. v. Papst, 374 F. Supp. 2d 231, 237 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that
cross-examination can be used as "a powerful weapon" against a lawyer who
"inappropriately 'coaches'" a witness); JEANs, supra note 138, § 2.4, at 21.
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It is even more important for a jury to learn about the extent of
coaching and other influences an attorney has upon an expert 197 for
two reasons. First, the expert witness, unlike the fact witness, can
base her testimony upon the information provided to her by the attor-
ney.198 Second, because the retaining attorney employs the expert
and controls the flow of fees to her, she often has substantially greater
power to shape her testimony. 199 If jurors deserve to hear about the
often relatively insubstantial influences of attorneys over fact witness,
they certainly deserve to hear about all of the efforts of a purse-string-
holding retaining attorney's efforts to shape expert testimony, includ-
ing those that could be classified as the retaining attorney's sharing of
data with the expert that, until the time of the sharing, could be clas-
sified as attorney work product. 20 0
Similarly, any court or other authority that prohibits ex parte con-
tact between attorneys and opposing experts potentially deprives op-
posing counsel, 20 and therefore the jurors who rely upon opposing
197. See Baum, 218 F.R.D. at 40 (observing that "experts have become a daily occur-
rence in federal courtrooms, and it is essential that a jury be able to evaluate
their opinions on the basis of information supplied them as they formulated those
opinions").
198. See FDIC v. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, No. 91-2791-CIV-HURLEY, 1994 WL 836318,
at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 1994) (noting that a rule permitting an attorney to share
her work product with a testifying expert without disclosing it to opposing coun-
sel "would in effect allow a party's lawyer to aid a witness with items of work
product while at the same time prevent totally the access that might reveal and
counteract the effects of such assistance"); Oishi, supra note 39, at 878; supra
subsection IV.A.2.a.iii.
199. See supra subsections IV.A.2.a.ii, iv.
200. See Amster v. River Capital Int'l Group, No. 00 CIV.9708 DC DF, 2002 WL
1733644 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2002) (allowing opposing counsel to fully explore re-
taining counsel's suggestions to the expert witness about changes in the expert's
report); Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 644, 647 (S.D. Ind.
2000) (agreeing with other courts that have held that "an attorney should not be
permitted to give a testifying expert witness a detailed 'road-map' for the desired
testimony without also giving the opposing party an opportunity to discover that
'map' and to cross-examine the expert about its effect on the expert's opinions in
the case"); McCrae, 295 B.R. at 678 (noting that the sharing of the retaining at-
torney's work product with a testifying expert "will potentially color the expert's
opinion"); Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n v. Fields, 75 P.3d 1088, 1101 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003); Gall, 44 P.3d at 240; cf Colindres v. Quietflex Mfg., 228 F.R.D.
567 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (requiring disclosure of document drafted by expert and sent
by the expert to the retaining attorney); Douglas R. Richmond, Regulating Expert
Testimony, 62 Mo. L. REV. 485, 487 (1997) (arguing that "expert witnesses merit
special attention because their testimony can be powerful and simultaneously
very 'misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it'" (quoting Jack B. Wein-
stein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be
Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991))).
201. See supra subsection V.A.1.
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counsel's cross-examination, 20 2 of some information. To the extent
that ex parte contact would have revealed information about the re-
taining attorney's influence upon the expert to the opposing counsel,
prohibition of that contact might prevent the jurors from receiving
this information.203
Finally, courts routinely provide even less information about the
relationship between witnesses and attorneys for a smaller class of
witnesses, those who are called by parties opposing the ones that orig-
inally expected to call them.2 04 When a fact witness is called to the
stand by a party other than the one originally expected to call her,
either party is usually free to elicit any relevant information about the
relationship between the witness and one of the parties.2 05 For exam-
ple, if the defendant in our hypothetical seat belt case calls the plain-
tiffs brother to testify that she was not wearing the seat belt, the
defendant will ask questions on direct examination about the
brother-sister relationship. 2 06 For expert witnesses, however, with
only a few exceptions, courts have prevented parties who unexpectedly
call witnesses to the stand to elicit information about the former rela-
tionship between the expert and the opposing party. In other words,
even those courts that allow a party opposing the one who initially
202. See Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 75 P.3d at 1101 (noting the link between
discovery and cross-examination).
203. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
204. For an argument that courts should routinely allow a party that calls an expert
originally retained by the opposing party to introduce evidence of that original
retention, see Easton, supra note 41, at 1481-92, 1496.
205. See, e.g., Thornton v. Vonallmon, 456 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); supra
subsection III.A.2.a.
206. Some judges might block evidence of the relationship between the witness and
the opposing party during direct examination because they sometimes do not al-
low the bolstering of a witness's credibility before that witness's credibility is at-
tacked on cross-examination. See Miller ex rel. Monticello Banking Co. v.
Marymount Med. Ctr., 125 S.W.3d 274, 283 (Ky. 2004). However, this is a rule of
courtroom efficiency that often is trumped by the importance of seeking the truth.
Id. The evidence of a relationship between a witness and the party opposing the
one calling the witness to the stand might be deemed important enough to justify
pre-attack bolstering. See TANFORD, supra note 48, at 232 (noting that the com-
mon ban on pre-attack bolstering "does not prohibit general background informa-
tion from the witness" or "enhancing a witness' credibility in ways that are
directly relevant to the witness' testimony"). This is particularly likely with re-
gard to an expert witness, because courts routinely allow pre-attack bolstering of
expert witnesses via a direct examination review of the expert's credentials.
In any event, even if the courtroom efficiency rule is applied, any cross-exami-
nation attack on the witness's credibility, however slight, would open the door to
introduction of the bias of the witness on redirect examination. Thus, in most
cases, the rule against pre-attack bolstering only determines when, not whether,
the bias evidence will be admitted.
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retained an expert to present the expert's testimony at trial2O7 have
almost universally20 8 not allowed the direct examiner to ask her to
testify that she was initially hired by the opposition. 20 9 Courts should
end this trend by allowing21O any party who calls an expert to expose
the prior or current relationship between any party and the expert. 2 11
Jurors who face the difficult task of deciding whether an expert is cor-
rect deserve to know which party hired her to analyze the evidence. 2 12
3. Changes in an Expert's Statements
Information about statements made by a witness before testifying
at trial represent still another area where, at first blush, the courts
seem to treat fact and expert witnesses similarly,213 but, when push
comes to shove, some courts foreclose opposing attorneys from an im-
portant source of information about retained experts.
Of course, opposing attorneys have the opportunity to force both
fact and expert witnesses to make statements at depositions that later
could be used at trial as prior inconsistent statements. 2 14 In this re-
spect, experts and fact witnesses are treated similarly.
However, an opposing attorney can make every effort to find any
and all written statements or other recordings of a fact witness's prior
recollections. It is, in fact, routine for attorneys to ask fact witnesses
whether they wrote diaries, journals, memos, or otherwise recorded
207. Some courts go even further, by refusing to allow a party opposing the one that
originally retained the expert witness from even calling this expert as a witness
at trial. See infra subsection V.A.4.
208. For two recent exceptions where courts allowed the initially opposing party to call
the expert and prove that she was initially retained by the other party, see
Vandenbraak v. Alfieri, Nos. Civ. A. 01-482 KAJ & Civ. A. 01-492 KAJ, 2005 WL
1242158, at *5 (D. Del. May 25, 2005); Miller, 125 S.W.3d at 282-84.
209. Easton, supra note 41, at 1445-47; see S.C. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v.
E.S.I. Invs., 505 S.E.2d 593, 596 (S.C. 1998) (identifying the "majority view" ex-
cluding evidence of the original retention of the expert).
210. Judges who are committed to the concept that the bolstering of a witness's credi-
bility should not precede an attack on that credibility could require a party offer-
ing the testimony of an expert originally hired by the other party to wait until
redirect examination to introduce testimony of that party's initial hiring of the
expert, but this will usually only delay the inevitable introduction of this evi-
dence. See supra note 206.
211. Miller, 125 S.W.3d at 282-84; cf E.S.L Invs., 505 S.E.2d at 596 (holding that
allowing evidence of the original retention is "within the sound discretion of the
trial court").
212. Miller, 125 S.W.3d at 284 (noting that in the "battle of experts" faced by the jury
in that case, "the jury was entitled to know who retained and paid each expert
witness ... so as to be able to judge each witness's overall credibility").
213. Prior inconsistent statements of both fact witnesses and experts can be used to
impeach the witness's trial testimony. MAUET & WOLFSON, supra note 50,
§12.4(2); Colleen Gale Treml, State v. Hunt: Rekindling Requirements for Im-
peaching One's Own Witness, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1236, 1239-40 (1990).
214. FED. R. Civ. P. 30, 31.
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their recollections or discussed them with anyone, including opposing
counsel. Attorneys can use the power of the subpoena duces tecum to
acquire these previous recordings.215
With experts, however, some courts provide more limited access.
An opposing attorney who wanted to see every prior statement by an
expert would be interested in seeing every draft of an expert's report
on the case, including those drafts upon which the retaining attorney
placed editing marks or other suggestions for changes. Any indication
that the retaining attorney, rather than the expert, created any por-
tion of a report that purports to be that of the expert would be a fertile
area for the cross-examination of that expert. Nonetheless, some 2 16
courts, again acting upon an overly expansive view of attorney work
product, allow attorneys and retained experts to refrain from provid-
ing drafts of the expert's reports that contain the retaining attorney's
written comments. 2 17 In the future, courts facing this issue should
require the production of all drafts of expert witness reports ex-
changed between the expert and the retaining attorney, 2 18 including
215. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1), 45.
216. In a recent case, the court faced a somewhat different issue, due to an interesting
twist in the facts. Amster v. River Capital Int'l Group, No. 00 CIV.9708 DC DF,
2002 WL 1733644 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2002). In this case, the retaining attorney
agreed to produce all drafts of the expert report that were marked up by the
retaining attorney and returned to the expert. Id. at *2. The opposing party also
sought to require the retaining attorney to produce drafts of the report upon
which the attorney had placed notes, where the attorney had not returned the
draft to the expert, but had used the copy of it with the markings to orally com-
municate the attorney's suggested changes to the expert. Id. The court prelimi-
narily denied this request, holding that it would "not require the production of
any handwritten attorney notes not actually provided to the expert." Id. at *3.
However, the court further held:
At [the expert's] deposition, defendant may test his recollection of his
conversations with counsel. If Mr. Love is unable to testify as to how his
report evolved, and, more specifically, as to which changes from draft to
draft were suggested by counsel, then defendants may renew their appli-
cation for production of the notes in question.
Id. This holding, in the main, is based upon the view that the opposing counsel is
entitled to fully explore the retaining attorney's influence on the expert's testi-
mony via receipt of all drafts containing the retaining counsel's suggestions to the
expert and via deposition questions and possibly even receipt of the attorney's
copies of drafts containing the attorney's suggestions that were orally communi-
cated to the expert.
217. See Easton & Romines, supra note 195, at 387; R. Tyler Hand, Recent Develop-
ments, Civil Procedure: Adler v. Shelton: The Discoverability of Expert's Draft
Opinions, 25 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 371, 374 (2001) (listing cases denying requests
for discovery of drafts of expert reports).
218. For more detailed discussion of the issues surrounding drafts of expert witness
reports, see Easton & Romines, supra note 195; see also Am. Fid. Assurance Co.
v. Boyer, 225 F.R.D. 520 (D.S.C. 2004) (compelling production of drafts of an ex-
pert's report); Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., No. 99 Civ. 9033 RCCHBP, 2004 WL
1746772, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2004) (compelling production of "[alny and all
documents pertaining to any and all outlines and/or any and all drafts of a report,
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any that contain the retaining attorney's writing or otherwise docu-
ment the retaining attorney's 21 9 attempts to influence the expert to
adopt changes in the report.2 20
4. Testimony From (Almost) All Disclosed Expert Witnesses
In one sometimes significant area, some courts do more than limit
the information about experts that opposing parties and jurors will
receive. Some courts go even further, by not allowing the jurors to
hear any testimony whatsoever from, or information about, some ex-
pert witnesses.
The experts who receive this rather unusual treatment 22 1 are
those who reach, or testify to, opinions that are helpful to the parties
opposing their initial employers. When the attorney who initially re-
tained the expert and disclosed her as someone who may present trial
testimony learns (sometimes at the expert's deposition, but occasion-
ally in private communications with the expert) that the expert has
reached opinions that are helpful to her opponent, she may attempt to
"de-disclose" the expert and thereby somehow render her ineligible to
testify at trials. 222 Unfortunately, despite the absence of any provi-
sion in the disclosure rules giving the attorney who initially discloses
an expert as a possible trial witness the right to somehow negate that
designation, several courts have given that attorney a veto power to
prevent her opponent from calling the expert as a witness at trial.22 3
study and/or memorandum by [the expert]"); Michael J. O'Hara & Graham
Mitenko, Scope of Discovery of an Expert's Work Product, J. LEGAL ECON., Fall
2000, at 37. For a collection of opinions requiring disclosure of drafts of expert
witness reports, see Hand, supra note 217, at 374-75.
219. Courts should also permit opposing parties to explore the extent to which other
persons substantially affected the expert's opinions, as the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York did in permitting the deposition of an
associate of an expert witness who "provided substantial assistance to [the ex-
pert] in preparing the expert report." Herman v. Marine Midland Bank, 207
F.R.D. 26, 31 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).
220. See supra note 216.
221. Generally, a jury is entitled to receive the testimony of all available witnesses.
See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Ams., Inc., No. Civ. A.01-
669(MPT), 2002 WL 1906628 (D. Del. Aug. 14, 2002); Shooker v. Superior Court,
4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 334, 337 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); State ex rel. Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v.
Crawford, 75 S.W.3d 244, 245 (Mo. 2002); In re State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 100
S.W.3d 338, 340 (Tex. App. 2002).
223. Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1221-23 (D.
Ariz. 2004), depublished by No. CIV 91-1764-PHX-DAE, 2004 WL 1921176 (D.
Ariz. Aug. 25, 2004); State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 100 S.W.3d at 340; cf Elyashiv
v. Elyashiv, 353 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that the probative
value of a letter written by an expert retained, but not disclosed as a testifying
expert, by the party opposing the party offering the letter was outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice); Callaway Golf Co., 2002 WL 1906628, at *4 (fore-
closing, for the most part, deposition of a de-disclosed expert); Zeidler v. A & W
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These courts discount, ignore, or forget that the initial disclosure
is, in part, the retaining attorney's declaration that the expert is a
potentially valuable source of information for the jurors. 22 4 These
courts also discount, ignore, or forget that, if an expert who has been
chosen, hired, coached, cajoled, and paid by one attorney nonetheless
reaches an opinion on a critical issue that hurts that attorney, there is
a fairly decent probability (though, of course, not an absolute cer-
tainty) that the disfavored opinion is correct 2 25 and is therefore a po-
tentially very valuable piece of information for the jurors. When
jurors face the difficult task of resolving a dispute between the expert
hired to replace the one fired by that attorney and the one hired by
opposing counsel, they would presumably give serious consideration to
the fact that another expert originally hired by one of the attorneys
reached an opinion disfavored by that attorney, if they learned of
these facts.22 6 Such evidence should be admitted. 2 27
The court's granting of veto power to an attorney to prevent a po-
tential witness from testifying through her unilateral action stands in
sharp contrast to the treatment courts give to fact witnesses. Regard-
less of whether a fact witness has an allegiance to (or enmity with) a
party or whether one party invested the time and effort of an attorney,
investigator, or legal assistant to locate that witness, either party is
ordinarily entitled to call that witness to the stand at trial. As many
Rests., Inc., No. 99 C 2591, 2001 WL 561367, at *5-*6 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2001)
(declaring moot the controversy regarding a defendant's proffer of an affidavit
from an expert originally retained by the other party, but indicating that there is
"a good deal of uncertainty about the law in this area"); Lusk Constr. Co. v.
Galaxie Plastering, Inc., No. G033077, 2005 WL 429579 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb 24,
2005) (disqualifying expert who had originally worked with an expert who had
been retained by the opposing party as well as attorney from other side who later
retained the expert, due to the expert's access to confidential information under
the original retention of his colleague); Easton, supra note 41, at 1443-45 (dis-
cussing various approaches to handling evidence sought from a de-disclosed
expert).
224. See Easton, supra note 41, at 1461-63.
225. See Muller v. Daniel Freeman Hosps., Inc., No. B169141, 2005 WL 488793, at *12
(Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2005); Easton, supra note 41, at 1501.
226. See Vandenbraak v. Alfieri, Nos. Civ. A. 01-482 KAJ & Civ. A. 01-492 KAJ, 2005
WL 1242158, at *5 (D. Del. May 25, 2005) (permitting introduction of expert testi-
mony offered by party opposing the party that initially retained the expert and
permitting evidence of this initial retention, because "a fact finder must judge the
weight and credibility of expert testimony .... which naturally should include an
understanding of the influences brought to bear on the expert").
227. See id. at *1; Crawford, 75 S.W.3d at 245 (permitting deposition of a de-disclosed
expert). For another analysis of the issues presented when a party seeks to intro-
duce the statements of an expert originally retained by the opposing party, see
Richmond, supra note 98, at 928-33.
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have stated, ordinarily the jury "has a right to every man's
evidence."2 28
B. Treating Experts Like Fact Witnesses:
The Nuts and Bolts
As with fact witnesses, if jurors are to receive information about
retained experts, opposing attorneys must first have access to it,229
because savvy attorneys usually will not ask a question on cross when
they do not know the answer to the question. 230 Therefore, courts
should require and permit disclosure, discovery, and self-help infor-
mation gathering about experts equivalent to that required and per-
mitted for fact witnesses. In addition, courts should admit relevant
testimony by and about experts regardless of which party offers it.
1. Ordinary Witness Rules that Are Readily Applicable to
Experts
Put simply, courts should eliminate counterproductive distinctions
between expert and fact witnesses and treat expert witnesses like
other witnesses. Courts and other authorities should:
* Facilitate information gathering by allowing attorneys who will
cross-examine disclosed retained experts to contact those wit-
nesses ex parte. 2 3 1
* Require disclosure and discovery regarding all communications
between attorneys and their retained experts to provide opponents
and jurors with full information about the influence of attorneys on
expert testimony.2 32
* Provide for automatic disclosure of all drafts of expert witness
reports, including those that have been marked up by retaining at-
torneys, to provide a total picture of all prior inconsistent state-
ments of experts and the reasons for changes. 233
228. JOHN H. WIGMORE, 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192 (1961); see also Doe v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983), cited in Domako v. Rowe, 475
N.W.2d 30, 36 (Mich. 1991) ("[N]o party to litigation has anything resembling a
proprietary right to any witness's evidence."); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, 3 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 501.03121 [a] (Joseph M. McLaughlin
ed., 2000) ("[Tihere is a general duty to give testimony, because the public has a
right to everyone's evidence.").
229. See Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n v. Fields, 75 P.3d 1088, 1101 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003) (discussing the link between open discovery and effective cross-
examination).
230. See supra subsection III.B.1.
231. See supra subsection IV.A.1.
232. See supra subsection IV.A.2.
233. See supra subsection IV.A.3.
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* Allow any party to introduce the testimony of witnesses who
have been disclosed as experts by any party. 234
* Admit bias testimony regarding the original retention, pay-
ment, and influencing of an expert by an attorney, even when the
party that initially opposed the expert calls her as a witness. 23 5
All of these positions can be adopted by courts without changes in pro-
cedural or professional responsibility rules. They are either consistent
with or required by the language of the current rules.
2. A Thornier Matter: The Anti-Quarantine Rule
To further facilitate information gathering from ex parte contact
with opposing retained experts, courts and other ethics authorities
should adopt a consistent interpretation of the term "agent" as it ap-
pears in professional responsibility and evidence rules. As previously
noted, the information-gathering potential of direct ex parte contact
between an attorney and witnesses aligned with the opposing party is
so valued that attorneys are ordinarily forbidden from asking wit-
nesses to avoid talking to their opponents. 2 36 The relevant anti-quar-
antine provision of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, however,
contains an "agent" exception that has been applied to retained ex-
perts and has therefore facilitated the thwarting of information gath-
ering through ex parte contact. At the same time, when interpreting
the identical term "agent" in the Federal Rules of Evidence, some
courts have adopted the opposite view of whether a retained expert is
an agent.
Under Rule 3.4(f) of the Model Rules, an attorney cannot "request a
person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant
information to another party unless: (1) the person is a relative or an
employee or other agent of a client."23 7 Because retained experts are
ordinarily neither relatives nor employees of the attorney's client, the
attorney is allowed to ask or instruct 238 a retained expert to not en-
gage in ex parte communications with the attorney's opponent only if
the retained expert is the client's "agent." There is some justification
234. See supra subsection IV.A.4.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 204-12.
236. See supra subsection III.B.2.c.
237. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2004). Subsection 2 of this rule pre-
vents an attorney from asking even a relative, employee, or agent of her client to
refrain from voluntarily providing information to opposing counsel if that per-
son's interests would be "adversely affected" by doing so. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.4(f)(2) (2004). In a civil case, this is usually not a significant addi-
tional restriction.
238. Given the reality that the attorney is the supervisor of the retained expert and
that the attorney can therefore fire the expert and cut off the flow of fees to her,
see supra subsection IV.A.2.a.ii, when an attorney asks a retained expert to do
something, she is, for all practical purposes, ordering her to do it.
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for the view that the retained expert is the client's agent, because the
expert has been hired and paid by and on behalf of the client to ana-
lyze information, reach opinions, and testify to those opinions on be-
half of the client.2 39
However, the word "agent" is the key term in another applicable
rule. Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that
the statements of a party's "agent" are the party's admissions. Under
this rule, a statement is not hearsay and is therefore admissible when
it is offered by the opposing party and it is "a statement by the party's
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship."240 When
a retained expert makes statements while working on behalf of the
party on whose behalf she was retained, she is arguably an agent of
that party. If that is the case, those statements should be admissible
against that party as non-hearsay admissions. However, even though
the term "agent" is often interpreted expansively enough to cover re-
tained expert witnesses in the context of the agent exception to the
anti-quarantine rule, some courts applying the identical term in the
context of the evidence rules hold that a retained expert is not the
agent of the party.24 1
239. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993), re-
printed in [Ethics Opinions 1991-1995] ABA/BNA Law. Manual on Prof. Conduct
(ABA) No. 138, at 1001:207-:208 (Jan. 26, 1994) ("[T]he opposing party or its
lawyer may properly have asked the expert not to discuss the case with the in-
quiring lawyer. See Model Rule 3.4(f).").
240. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D). The immediately preceding subsection of this rule
provides that a statement is not hearsay and is therefore admissible if it is of-
fered by the opposing party and it is "a statement by a person authorized by the
party to make a statement concerning the subject." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C).
This provision might also render a statement by a retained expert admissible in
some circumstances, but it is difficult to imagine a circumstance where the lan-
guage of this subsection would apply, but the language of the next subsection
regarding agents would not also apply and render the retained expert's statement
admissible. Therefore, this Article focuses on the agent subsection of the rule.
241. See Kirk v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 162-64 (3d Cir. 1995); Koch v.
Koch Indus., 37 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1244-45 (D. Kan. 1998); Liftee v. Boyer, 117
P.3d 821, 827-28 (Haw. Ct. App. 2004); Taylor v. Kohli, 642 N.E.2d 467, 468-69
(Ill. 1994), cited in Greaney v. Indus. Comm'n, 832 N.E.2d 331, 340-41 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2005), and Kraft Gen. Foods v. Indus. Comm'n, 678 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997); cf. Sabel v. Mead Johnson & Co., 737 F. Supp. 135, 137-40 (D.
Mass. 1990) (holding that statements made by a collection of expert consultants
at a pre-litigation "brainstorming session" were not admissions of agents, because
the alleged principal did not control the experts during the session). But see Col-
lins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 780-82 (5th Cir. 1980); ONTI, Inc. v. Integra
Bank, No. Civ. A. 14514, 1998 WL 671263 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1998); but cf. Krep-
pel v. Guttman Breast Diagnostic Inst., No. 95CIV10830(SWK)(MHD), 1999 WL
1243891, at *1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1999) (holding that an expert witness report
disclosed by a retaining party who "was obviously fully aware of [the expert's]
opinions and analysis by no later than the date on which its counsel received the
report" was an admissible adoptive admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) of the Fed-
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Though the term agent is admittedly imprecise, it is illogical to
give it two different meanings in the same context. Either a retained
expert is an agent of the party on whose behalf she is retained, or she
is not. There is some basis, of course, for either interpretation of
"agent," because the retained expert has a dual role. She is to some
extent a member of the trial team24 2 of the party who is paying her
fees and is, in this sense, an agent. However, she is also a witness
who is sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, 24 3 unlike the attorney who represents the client, who is allowed
to advance positions in court that she does not personally believe, as
long as there is some non-frivolous basis for doing s0. 244 In other
words, an expert witness's loyalty to the person paying her fees is sup-
posed to be trumped by her duty to testify truthfully, so she is not as
much of an agent of the client as the attorney who supervises her
work.2 4
5
As long as the term "agent" is the critical one and it is not further
defined, however, it should not receive opposing interpretations in the
context of the same basic factual circumstances (i.e., the retained ex-
pert witness). If a retained expert is considered the party's "agent" for
purposes of allowing an attorney to quarantine her from ex parte con-
tact with her opponent, she should also be considered the party's
agent for purposes of making non-hearsay admissions that are admis-
sible against the party. Under both rules, either the expert's role as a
member of the trial team should be considered predominant over her
duty to serve as a truth-telling witness, or her role as a truth-telling
witness should be considered predominant over her membership on a
trial team. Because a primary goal of the system is finding the truth,
and because the represented party has an agent, the attorney, who
has a greater duty of loyalty to her, I believe a retained expert should
not be considered the party's agent in either context. Therefore, under
the current Model Rules, I would prohibit an attorney from in-
structing a retained expert to refrain from ex parte contact with op-
posing counsel, 246 but not hold that statements of retained experts are
automatically non-hearsay admissions. However, I concede that there
is merit to the opposite view and that the term agent is unfortunately
imprecise.
eral Rules of Evidence, so there was no need to determine whether it was an
admission by an agent of the retaining party under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)).
242. See supra subsection IV.A.2.a.ii.
243. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-25 (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.605(1)
(West 1999); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-1402 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.320 (2003).
244. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2004).
245. See Richmond, supra note 200, at 486-87 (contending that "[elxperts should not
be the litigation equivalent of hired guns" or advocates for parties and noting that
this view "represents the prevailing federal perspective").
246. See Easton, supra note 175, at 745-46.
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VI. ADVANTAGES
Treating experts like other witnesses will have several advan-
tages.2 47 At least one of these advantages stems from a phenomenon
that some might first see as a disadvantage.
A. Providing Jurors with Information to Assist Their
Evaluation of Expert Testimony
Most importantly, treating experts like other witnesses will pro-
vide jurors with information about them and their relationships with
the attorneys who employ them that they can use to evaluate expert
testimony.248 Given the tremendous potential influence of retaining
attorneys over their experts,2 49 providing this information is at least
as important as providing similar information for fact witnesses. 25 0
247. In addition to the advantages discussed in the text, there is another possible ad-
vantage to treating expert and fact witnesses alike. Several of the proposals pro-
moted here involve the earlier distribution of information about experts in the
discovery phase of litigation. Some have suggested that, in some circumstances,
the distribution of information among parties can lead to earlier settlement, be-
cause lack of information can make parties reluctant to settle. See In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, 148 F.3d 487, 492 (5th Cir. 1998); Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton,
60 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995); State ex rel. State v. Riley, 992 S.W.2d 195,
197 (Mo. 1999) (en banc). If this is the case, the proposed distribution of expert
information might lead to earlier settlement in some cases and, therefore, to the
prevention of additional litigation expenses that otherwise would have been in-
curred by the parties and, sometimes, by the court. See Easton, supra note 24, at
572-76.
On the other hand, there is also a potentially significant disadvantage to my
proposal. If communications between expert witnesses and the attorneys who
retain them must be more fully disclosed, but communications between expert
consultants and attorneys generally need not be disclosed, see FED. R. Crv. P.
26(b)(4)(B); supra text accompanying note 153, parties who are able to hire two
experts (one to serve as a testifying witness and one to serve as a consultant) will
have an edge over parties who are able to hire only one expert. Thus, my propo-
sal can be seen as increasing the cost of litigation for those who decide to hire two
experts and providing wealthier parties who can afford to do so an advantage
over opposing parties who cannot afford to do so. In my opinion, the benefits to
the truth-seeking function outweigh this disadvantage. It is also worth noting
that many of the advantages of hiring two experts exist even under the less com-
plete disclosure of expert-attorney relationships currently allowed by some
courts.
248. In re McCrae, 295 B.R. 676, 678-79 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2003) (noting that disclo-
sure of information about the attorney's forwarding of materials to her retained
expert will facilitate more effective cross-examination to "test" the expert's opin-
ion at trial); Waits, supra note 125, at 443-44 (arguing for an approach to expert
witness testimony aimed at "preventing or exposing the adversarial molding,
subtle and otherwise, of expert testimony").
249. See supra subsection IV.A.2.a.
250. In a recent decision permitting discovery of work product materials an attorney
shared with her expert, a federal court explained:
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B. Establishing Clear Rules
By eliminating distinctions between experts and other witnesses,
courts will universalize the already well-known rules applicable to
fact witnesses. This should lessen the amount of time that courts
spend resolving discovery and admissibility disputes that arise when
some, but not all, courts distinguish between fact and expert
witnesses. 25 1
In addition, clear rules that are universally applied make it easier
for attorneys to act in their clients' best interests. 2 52 When rules are
unclear, even well-informed attorneys cannot be certain which con-
duct is in their clients' best interests. 25 3 For example, given the un-
certainty about whether an attorney can initiate ex parte contact with
opposing retained experts, 254 an attorney who believes that such con-
tact would be in her client's best interests cannot be certain about
what course of action to take. Because some courts and other profes-
sional responsibility authorities have sanctioned attorneys who en-
gage in such ex parte contact, there is the possibility that undertaking
this course will hurt the client. On the other hand, because some have
allowed such contact, an attorney who refrains from it may be depriv-
ing her client of something that could benefit her.
The most important justification for instituting mandatory disclosure...
is to promote effective cross-examination. Without pre-trial access to at-
torney-expert communications, opposing counsel may not be able to un-
cover and reveal effectively the influence that counsel has achieved over
the expert's testimony .... Given that attacking credibility through a
full and fair cross-examination is a "vitally important task in the usual,
and increasingly frequent, 'battle of experts,'" therefore, protecting com-
munications between attorneys and experts significantly obstructs an
important goal.
Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ICT Group, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 110, 117 (E.D.N.Y.
2002) (quoting Karn v. Ingersoll Rand, 168 F.R.D. 633, 640 (N.D. Ind. 1996)); see
also TV-3, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 194 F.R.D. 585, 588 (S.D. Miss. 2000)
(discussing the importance of discovery of shared work product in making cross-
examination of an expert effective); Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc.,
194 F.R.D. 644, 647 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (discussing the importance of discovery of
shared work product); Gall v. Jamison, 44 P.3d 233, 240 (Colo. 2002) (discussing
the importance of discovery of shared work product in a state case).
251. See, e.g., Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., 212 F.R.D. at 117; Taylor v. Anderson-Tully
Co., 151 F.R.D. 295, 295 (W.D. Tenn. 1993); Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n v.
Fields, 75 P.3d 1088, 1102 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Gall, 44 P.3d at 239; Waits,
supra note 125, at 447; Oishi, supra note 39, at 880.
252. See Gall, 44 P.3d at 239.
253. Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., 212 F.R.D. at 117-18.
254. See supra subsection JV.A.1.
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C. Introducing Additional Risk into Expert-Attorney
Relationships
Some argue that more complete revelation of information about an
attorney's influencing of an expert witness would make the relation-
ship between an attorney and her retained expert less comfortable.255
After all, if an attorney's coaching of an expert will become known to
her opponent and if there is the possibility that an expert who is a
friend today may later become a foe, the attorney should be at least a
bit more cautious in her efforts to mold that expert's testimony.25 6
There is no doubt that providing additional information about at-
torney-expert relationships and allowing any party to call disclosed
experts as witnesses will, or at least should, make attorneys some-
what more restrained in their dealings with experts. For a system
that is designed, at least in significant part, to be a search for the
truth,2 57 that development is not to be dreaded, but applauded.2 58
Given the concerns about the ready ability of attorneys to purchase
and mold expert testimony, we should welcome changes that make it
even somewhat more likely that the jury will hear something closer to
the expert's own views, 25 9 even though at least some of the attorneys
who are familiar and comfortable with their control over experts will
dread losing any of that control, or of the opportunity to exercise it
privately.2 60
VII. CONCLUSION
Many have recognized the problems associated with the ready abil-
ity of attorneys to mold the testimony of retained expert witnesses for
a system that wishes to find the truth. For many, the real issue is not
255. See Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., 212 F.R.D. at 117; Adler v. Shelton, 778 A.2d
1181, 1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Helton v. Kincaid, No. CA2004-08-
099, 2005 WL 1324729, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 6, 2005); Marsh, supra note
105, at 213-14.
256. Waits, supra note 125, at 444 (observing that "it seems a safe assumption that,
knowing that their expert preparation activities will be subject to full exposure by
their opponent, attorneys will avoid coaching and opinion work product selection
techniques that would undermine the expert witness's credibility").
257. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
258. Mfg. Admin. & Mgmt. Sys., 212 F.R.D. at 117 (concluding that "mitigating the
expert's role as an advocate" by requiring disclosure of the retaining attorney's
influence via sharing of work product "is, in fact, desirable").
259. Waits, supra note 125, at 443-44 (promoting a view of retained experts that
"posits not only the importance of expert testimony, but of the need to have that
testimony actually be as independent as it purports to be").
260. Miller ex rel. Monticello Banking Co. v. Marymount Med. Ctr., 125 S.W.3d 274,
284 (Ky. 2004) (noting that some had argued that introducing evidence about the
relationship between a party and a retained expert "will have a 'chilling effect' on
the future retention of expert witnesses").
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whether the ready availability of faulty expert testimony is a problem,
but what can or should be done to address it.
Exclusion of scientifically invalid testimony is certainly a step in
the right direction. Whenever an incorrect expert opinion is kept from
the jury, a potential injustice might be averted. Despite the impor-
tance of Daubert exclusion, though, it is at most an impartial response
to a widespread problem. Despite the Supreme Court's admonition to
trial court judges to seriously consider exclusion, faulty expert testi-
mony is commonplace, particularly in cases where jurors are
presented with opposing opinions that cannot possibly both be correct.
Some have suggested the more drastic remedy of eliminating ex-
pert witness fees paid by the parties. These reformers often suggest
that expert testimony should come primarily or only from those who
are paid by the courts.2 6 1 Although this suggestion has some merit, it
also has its share of problems.2 62 Regardless of this idea's merit, or
the lack thereof, there does not appear to be any reasonable prospect
that court experts will entirely forbid party-financed experts in the
foreseeable future. 2 63
Like it or not, then, it appears that the party-paid, attorney-domi-
nated expert witness will remain a fixture of American civil litigation
for some time. Like it or not, despite Daubert, she will continue to
testify in many cases, even when her conclusions on critical issues are
incorrect. Like it or not, jurors will be forced to try to determine which
261. See, e.g., Deason, supra note 106, at 61 & n.3; Easton, supra note 24, at 492 n.82
(citing supporters of court-appointed experts).
262. See Easton, supra note 24, at 492 n.82; Robert L. Hess II, Note, Judges Cooperat-
ing with Scientists: A Proposal for More Effective Limits on the Federal Trial
Judge's Inherent Power to Appoint Technical Advisors, 54 VAND. L. REv. 547, 549
(2001) (noting and discussing the "problems" even under the current limited sys-
tem allowing judges to appoint experts in addition to those retained by the
parties).
Relying solely or primarily upon court-appointed experts would require some
mechanism for the financing of the often substantial fees that experts earn. Also,
it would be a substantial departure from the American tradition that it is the
parties, not the court, who are responsible for acquiring and presenting evidence.
Some also see it as an encroachment upon the domain of the jury, because jurors
would be hard pressed to reach verdicts inconsistent with the opinion of the only
expert who testified.
263. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow courts to appoint experts. FED. R. EVID. 706.
Indeed, the ability of courts to appoint experts was widely recognized even before
the adoption of the Federal Rules. See FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee's
notes; Deason, supra note 106, at 79. Under the current law, however, the ap-
pointment of an expert by the court does not preclude the parties from also re-
taining expert witnesses. American courts very rarely appoint experts under the
current structure. Langbein, supra note 97, at 841. For the foreseeable future, it
is difficult to imagine American courts adopting the overhaul of the current sys-
tem that would be entailed in courts, and only courts, retaining experts.
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expert is wrong, when the judge is not able to do the job for them in
response to a Daubert motion to exclude faulty expert testimony.
If we are going to trust, and force, jurors to undertake the diffi-
cult 2 64 task of identifying faulty expert testimony, we should at least
provide them with information that can help them perform this diffi-
cult task. At a minimum, that information should include the types of
information that we readily provide about fact witnesses, who cannot
be paid by attorneys and who are therefore subject to far less control
by attorneys. If we are going to allow attorneys to mold the expert
testimony that jurors are expected to evaluate, we should not hide the
full extent of that manipulation.
This, too, is only a partial solution, because giving jurors more in-
formation to help them identify incorrect expert testimony will neither
eliminate such testimony nor guarantee that jurors will identify it.
Nonetheless, it is both an important step and a rather easy one to
implement, because it simply involves application of a set of already
well-established principles.
264. Cf In re Application of the Comm. for the Pres. of the Constitutional Right to
Trial by Jury, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) ("[N]o judge or jury
knows whether a 'light was red or green,' or whether 'a car was on the wrong side
of the road, or how fast it was going.'. . . [T]hey can but listen to the testimony of
witnesses and decide the case on the basis of credibility .... ") (quoting Justice
Peck's radio address on station WMCA).
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